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Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory Spillover
KATHERINE SHA w• AND ALEX STEINt

The constitutional law of abortion stands on the untenable assumption that any
state's abortion regulations impact citizens of that state alone. On this understanding, the state 's boundaries demarcate the te"ain on which women 's right to abortion
clashes with state power to regulate that right.
This Article uncovers a previously unnoticed horizontal dimension of abortion
regulation: the medical-malpractice penalties imposed upon doctors for failing to
inform patients about abortion risks; the states ' power to define those risks, along
with doctors' informed-consent obligations and penalties; and, critically, the possibility that such standards might cross state lines. Planned Parenthood v. Casey and
other decisions that have approved abortion-specific informed-consent requirements
have failed to account for this interstate dynamic.
In recent years, fourteen states, led by South Dakota, have enacted statutes that
direct doctors to warn patients, as part of an informed-consent dialogue, that abortion might cause depression and even suicide ideation and actual suicide. Although
there is broad medical consensus that such warnings are unnecessary, courts have
nonetheless concluded that the Supreme Court's Casey decision shields them.from
constitutional challenge. This may have implications not just in the states that mandate such warnings, but nationwide. Because doctors' informed-consent obligations
incorporate medical information and practices from other jurisdictions, a doctor's
failure to warn a patient about postabortion depression may expose her to liability
for medical malpractice-even where her own state does not mandate such a warning statutorily. Eliminating this risk by warning a patient that abortion might lead to
depression costs the doctor much less than the penalties she might incur for withholding that information.
This dynamic-which we term the "South Dakota ejfect"-threatens to transform
informed-consent practices across the country, with profound consequences for
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women's willingness to elect abortion andfor the experiences ofwomen who choose
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INTRODUCTION

Profound state variation has long characterized our law of abortion. In 1973, the
year Roe v. Wade 1 was decided, thirty-one states prohibited abortion except where
necessary to save a woman's life.2 In a number of states, criminal prosecutions of
doctors who performed abortions were common; 3 in some of those states, not just
doctors but also patients could in theory face criminal penalties. 4 On the other end of
the spectrum, by 1973, four states5 broadly permitted "abortion without restriction
'early' in pregnancy,"6 and a number of other states had liberalized their abortion
laws to varying degrees. 7
Roe, of course, dramatically changed the constitutional landscape, holding that
the Constitution protects-at least to some degree-a woman's right to decide for

I. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a
Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 , 614 (2007).
3. Reva B. Siegel, Roe's Roots: The Women 's Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90
B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2010).
4. HEATHER 0. BOONSTRA, RACHEL BENSON GOLD, CORY L. RICHARDS & LAWRENCE B.
FINER, GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION IN WOMEN'S LIVES 11 (2006).
5. Those states were New York. Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska Rachel Benson Gold,
lessons From Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. PoL'Y, Mar.
2003, at 8.
6. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2047 (2011).
7. BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 12; see also LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL,
BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT'S RULING 120-22 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010).
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herself whether to terminate a pregnancy. 8 Accordingly, Roe invalidated state laws
that wholesale prohibited abortion. But the Roe Court continued to credit a strong
state interest in regulating abortion, including in order to promote potential life. 9
Crafting a trimester framework to balance these competing interests, Roe held that
during the first trimester of pregnancy, when abortion is relatively uncomplicated
and the fetus cannot live outside the womb, a woman's privacy and autonomy interests trump any state interest in regulation. As the pregnancy progresses, the state's
interest in regulation becomes stronger, so that by the beginning of the third trimester,
the state can prohibit abortion outright, except where necessary to preserve a
woman's life or health. 10
Roe's preservation of state regulatory prerogatives meant that state law continued
to vary dramatically in the post-Roe era. And the most significant post-Roe case,
Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 11 only increased states'
regulatory power in the context of abortion. Dispensing altogether with Roe's trimester framework, Casey held that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating to
protect women's health and safety, and to promote potential life, for the duration of
a pregnancy. 12 Under Casey's framework, abortion regulations will be sustained so
long as they do not impose an "undue burden" on a woman's ability to choose to
terminate a pregnancy prior to viability. 13 Application of the undue burden standard- which permits regulations that do not have the "purpose or effect" of"plac[ing]
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion" 14-has vindicated
state regulation of abortion facilities, procedures, and decisions. Among other things,
it has allowed states to prescribe special rules for informed consent to abortion, 15

8. See Theodore W. Ruger, Health law's Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 640--41
(2008) ("Although the formal doctrine remains largely the same since Roe, the underlying
right has evolved dramatically from a relational right protective of physician and patient autonomy to an individualistic right held by the woman alone.").
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)(recognizing"the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life").
10. Id. at 164-66.
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. Id. at 846.
13. Id. at 878. Following viability, the balance of interests tilts sharply in favor of the
state, which may regulate to the point of prohibition so long as the law contains an exception
to preserve the life or health of the woman. Id. at 879. For powerful contemporary analysis of
Casey's "undue burden" doctrine, see Reva Siegel & Linda Greenhouse, Casey and the Clinic
Closings: When "Protecting Health" Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428 (2016).
14. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
I 5. In Casey itself, the Court upheld provisions of Pennsylvania law that required physicians to "inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and
of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age of the unborn child,"' in addition to advising
the woman of"the availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus
and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child
support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as
alternatives to abortion." Id. at 881 ; see also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 471 - 72 (7th Cir.
1999) (upholding Wisconsin statute requiring doctors to inform women seeking abortions of
"the 'medical risks' associated with abortion including the risk of 'psychological trauma,"'
but allowing doctors to exercise "best medical judgment" in determining exact contents of
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exposing the rules' violators to a range of sanctions, including liability for medical
malpractice. 16 States defend these rules as informing, rather than hindering, women's
choice. 17 And courts have for the most part credited such justifications. 18
Consider the South Dakota statute that requires abortion providers to tell patients
seeking abortions that "the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being"; that abortion might lead to "[ d]epression and related
psychological distress" or "[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide"; and that
pregnant women are eligible for childbirth and neonatal support. 19 As a matter of
state law, failure to provide such warnings will violate the patient's right to informed
consent and expose violators to liability for malpractice and other penalties. 20 The
statute essentially compels doctors to urge women to reconsider abortion decisions.
To that end, it introduces a mandatory warning that amalgamates controversial and
contested information, gives that information official recognition, and uses doctors
to make the information appear credible.2 1

warnings); Fargo Women' s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526,531 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding North Dakota law similar to Pennsylvania informed consent provision at issue in Casey).
16. In every state, violation of a patient' s right to informed consent is actionable in tort.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS§ 6.3 (1999). In addition, the statutes we address here designate women seeking abortions as their beneficiaries, which makes their breaches actionable.
See id. § 6.4, at 146-50 (victims of health and safety statutes' violations can generally sue
violators in tort); see also Reva 8 . Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1724 (2008)( observing that, after Roe
v. Wade, the antiabortion movement mobilized medical malpractice and informed-consent
laws to block women's access to abortion).
17. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889,906 (8th
Cir. 2012) (en bane) (finding "no unconstitutional hindrance of the woman' s choice" in statemandated advisory linking abortion and suicide).
18. See, e.g., id.; Karlin, 188 F.3d at 471 ; Fargo Women 's Health, 18 F.3d at 531. We
should note that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,
No. 15-274 (U.S. June 27, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/l5pdt715-274.J)8k0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28S6-EZSW]- which struck down a law requiring Texas clinics to conform
to the requirements of ambulatory surgical centers and doctors who perform abortions to have
admitting privileges at nearby hospitals-demonstrated that the ''undue burden" standard does
not authorize any abortion regulation a state might devise. To date, the decision has not had
any impact on abortion-specific informed-consent requirements of the sort we discuss here.
But the opinion does suggest an active judicial role in carefully scrutinizing the medical claims
upon which abortion regulations are predicated. See id. at 20 (describing "[t]he statement that
legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty" as " inconsistent
with this Court's case law"). So it may well be deployed in renewed attacks on the constitutionality of such laws.
19. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§§ 34-23A-I.7, -10. I(I), (2) (2011). For a discussion of laws
like South Dakota' s as a form of"abortion exceptionalism"--that is, the singling out of abortion "for more restrictive government regulation as compared to other, similar procedures"see generally Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling
laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER& L. I, 3, 6 (2012).
20. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A- I. 7 (2011 ); see also supra note 16 (discussing tort liability). Other penalties extend to the criminal. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-I0.2 (2011)
("Statement of informed consent- Misdemeanor . . . .").
21. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. Similarly motivated statutes in other
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Animating this statute is an antiabortion policy of the sort the Supreme Court
credited as legitimate in both Roe and Casey. 22 The majority of South Dakotans appear to support this policy. 23 Residents who favor unrestricted abortion rights have
no real voice in South Dakota. Under conventional theories offederalism, their only
remedy is exit: all they can do is move to a state whose abortion laws are less restrictive. 24 Whatever the minority-view holders choose to do, the statute will remain the
law of South Dakota; its effects will be felt within the state's borders, and, so long
as the statute does not contravene constitutional limits-as the Eighth Circuit has

states require doctors to provide empirically unsupported warnings that tie abortion to breast
cancer. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(a)(3), -6710(a)(2)----(3) (Supp. 2014) (mandating that doctors tell patients that abortion may cause breast cancer when this risk is objectively
present); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 145.4242(a)(l)(i) (West 2011) (same, but with a proviso that
information must be provided ''when medically accurate"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-4133(1)(a)(ii) (West 2007) (same as Minnesota); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 50-20-104(5)(a)(i)(2015)
(same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(l)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 2015)
(same); see also Div. of Pub. Health, Possible Medical Risks or Complications of Abortion,
ALASKA DEP'T HEALTH & Soc. SERVS. (2015), http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages
/informedconsenUabortion/risks.aspx [https://perma.cc/EX67-B7MJ] (mentioning that ''the
American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists ... supports the view that
there is a causal relationship between breast cancer and the termination of pregnancy"). See
generally infra note 69 (listing studies repudiating the cancer-abortion link).
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) ("[T]he State may
enact rules and regulations designed to encourage [a woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing
the pregnancy to full term .... '[T]he Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to
democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth."' ( quoting Webster
v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,511 (1989))).
23. See REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 4 (2005),
http-J/www.dakotavoice.com/Docs/South%20Dakota%20Abortion%20Task%20Force%i20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3PD-B2CC) (noting that the Task Force was created by a vote of 63-4 in
the House and 28-6 in the Senate); Steven Ertelt, South Dakota Polls Show Conflicting Result
on Abortion Ban's Future, LIFENEWS.COM (Nov. 15, 2007), http://archive.lifenews.com
/state2607.html [https://perma.cc/3PZU-UKF9] (reporting that polls show a majority of South
Dakotans support a ban on abortions except for life-saving purposes and in cases of rape and
incest).
24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMJC ANALYSIS OF LAW 893 (8th ed. 2011) ("[P]eople
can sort themselves between states in accordance with their preferences. The right to move to
a different state supplements voting power in controlling the action of government officials.");
Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150
(1992) ("Federalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet." ); Seth F. Kreimer,
Response, Lines in the Sand: The Importance ofBorders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 973, 982 (2002) ("[A] citizen ofTexas who finds that state' s prohibitions on same sex
relations too onerous can move to Vermont, while a citizen of New York whose desire to own
assault weapons is unrealizable can move to Montana." (footnote omitted)); cf Fergus Ryan,
The Geography of Abortion (Dec. 11 , 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com
/abstract=2702506 [https://perma.cc/RUE6-R5NN] (tying Ireland's restrictive abortion rights
to the freedom to travel and wide accessibility of abortion in the nearby Great Britain). See
generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLfNE lN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3- 5 (1970).
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concluded25---neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has any say in this intrastate
business.
But what if the impact of South Dakota's regulation is not limited to South
Dakota?26 In this Article, we argue that the critical assumption that laws like South
Dakota's have no interstate effects misses a key aspect of the doctrine of informed
consent and its impact on doctors' behavior. Specifically, this assumption ignores
the effect of the emergence and official ratification of new medical information and
practices-including information and practices with contestable credentials-on
doctors' disclosure obligations. Attending to the operation of the law of informed
consent reveals that state medical malpractice laws pose a hitherto unrecogniz.ed
threat both to women's exercise of abortion rights nationwide and to the basic principle that each state may decide for itself how to balance the competing interests at
stake in abortion.
The mechanism by which state regulations like South Dakota's might impose
spillover effects on other states-including states whose laws provide for relatively
broad access to abortion 27-is straightforward. Two distinct paradigms govern information disclosure in the context of informed consent. Thirty states follow the "doctors' custom" standard, which requires doctors to inform patients about the nature,
risks, and benefits of a treatment, along with the medically approved alternatives, to
the extent that such disclosure is customary within the medical profession. 28 The remaining twenty states and the District of Columbia use the "patient expectation"
standard, under which doctors must tell patients everything that a reasonable patient
would wish to know about the treatment and its alternatives. 29 Critically for purposes
of the present discussion, the "patient expectation" standard generally requires doctors to inform patients about a risk of death or serious harm even when that risk is
extremely low. 30 The "doctors' custom" standard, on the other hand, does not recogniz.e this disclosure obligation. 31 Under both standards, a doctor's failure to provide
requisite information to her patient constitutes an actionable tort. 32 Under this framework, state regulation that requires doctors to advise pregnant women that abortion

25 . Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905----06 (8th Cir.
2012) (en bane) (upholding South Dakota's suicide proviso against constitutional challenge);
see also Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662,673 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding
general risk advisory), vacated in part on rehearing en bane, 662 F.3d 1072 (2011).
26. But see Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1338 (2009) (observing that states like South Dakota that
"push the boundaries of Casey are few in number and limited. in influence").
27. See generally GlITTMACHER lNST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE
ABORTION LAW (2016).
28. See infra notes 148- 50 and Table I.
29. See infra notes 148-50 and Table I.
30. See infra notes 90--94 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 89 and sources cited therein.
32. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34-23A-1.7 (201 l)("The South Dakota common law
cause of action for medical malpractice informed consent claims based upon the reasonable
patient standard is reaffirmed and is hereby expressly declared to apply to all abortion procedures."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34-23A-10. l(l)(e)(i)--(ii) (2011) (specifying South Dakota's
special informed consent requirements for abortion, which include providing "(a] description
of all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant risk factors to which
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might lead to serious depression or suicide will gradually spread to other states,
whose doctors will begin providing similar warnings as part of their informedconsent dialogues with patients. This dynamic will first unfold in the states that follow the "patient expectation" standard. Under this standard, depression and suicide
squarely fall into the "death or serious harm" category. For that reason, information
about even a low probability of postabortion depression or suicide, ratified by another state in the form of mandatory warnings, may fall within the scope of disclosure
that a reasonable patient would expect from her doctor. 33 This reasonable expectation
will gradually compel doctors to begin warning patients about postabortion depression and suicide. Failure to give this warning may expose doctors to liability for
malpractice and possible blacklisting in the National Practitioner Data Bank. 34 The
"depression and suicide" warning will thus spread across all states that follow the
"patient expectation" standard.
Because those states are numerous, their adoption of the "depression and suicide"
warning will gradually change doctors' practices nationwide. We expect this change
to occur due to two factors. The first factor is the negligible cost of the warning: it
costs doctors very little 35 to provide the "depression and suicide" warning in their
conversations with patients or in the office paperwork that patients must read and
sign. The second factor is doctors' aversion to the risk of malpractice liability. To
reduce this risk, doctors develop special protocols known as defensive medicine. 36
Overinforming patients about remote risks is one of those protocols. 37 We call this
regulatory spillover the "South Dakota effect." This spillover is analogous to the
famous California effect in environmental regulation. 38 California's hydrocarbon and

the pregnant woman would be subjected," including "[d]epression and related psychological
distress" as well as "increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide"). In South Dakota, any
such violation is also punishable criminally as a Class 2 misdemeanor. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 34-23A-I0.2 (2011).
33. See infra notes 89- 94, 120--22 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
35. We ignore ideological costs here.
36. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Essay, The Distortionary Effect ofEvidence
on Primany Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 537- 38, 545--46 (2010) (showing that selfinterested doctors use defensive medicine to create evidence that fends off malpractice suits);
see also Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEAL TH
ECONOMICS 1339, 1368-69 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (discussing
defensive medicine); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Essay, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for
National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 844, 852- 54 (2009)
(same). Arguably, a doctor's warning about postabortion depression might drive away patients, which might result in a loss of income. We estimate that the loss-of-income scenario is
unlikely, since a patient opting out of the procedure frees up time for another patient. Furthermore, an economically minded doctor would rather lose a patient than expose herself to the
risk of malpractice liability.
37. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 36, at 545--46; cf James Gibson, Doctrinal
Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1644--45, 1653-61 (2008) (arguing
that risk-averse doctors tend to prefer excessive treatment options that fend off malpractice
suits and that such practices gradually transform into legally binding customs). Our argument
applies to all doctors, regardless of their attitude toward risk.
38. We present here a simplified version of the California effect. For further details and
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nitrogen oxide emission standards for cars are more stringent than the federal
Environmental Protection Agency requirements. Compliance with California's demanding standards increases car production costs, but manufacturers must incur this
additional expense in order to sell their cars to Californians. California's market for
cars is simply too big to pass up. Furthermore, making cars with different emission
systems that satisfy different regulatory requirements is far too complicated. Manufacturers consequently prefer to use California's emission standards for all cars. 39
A similar cost-benefit calculation may motivate doctors across the United States
to add South Dakota-style "depression and suicide" warnings to their disclosure dialogues. South Dakota is not a large enough state to give global effect to its informedconsent requirements for abortion. Yet, together with a few like-minded states, it has
managed to create a liability threat for all doctors and an option to remove that threat
at very low cost. 40 Although our account of the South Dakota effect is largely theoretical, there is evidence that the threat has already begun to materialize. 41
Because of the self-updating nature of informed consent, requirements like South
Dakota's may have implications that cut across state lines. These implications include the interstate dissemination of potentially misleading information about the
risks of abortion. The medical community holds that abortion is not causally connected to suicide, depression, breast cancer, infertility, or other ailments. 42 This view
is well grounded in empirical research. 43 Because abortion can be a stressful event,
it may have undesirable psychological effects; but research suggests that for an average woman with no psychiatric history, postpartum depression is at least as likely
as postabortion depression. 44
For these reasons, we believe legislative intervention is required to eliminate the
South Dakota effect. This intervention could follow two distinct paths. First,
Congress could act to eliminate the South Dakota effect. A number of scholars have

insightful analysis, see Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1097, 1107- 12 (2009).
39. For other influential analyses of the California effect, see DAVID VOGEL, TRA!)[NG UP:
CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION rN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259--{;() (1995) (describing and analyzing the California effect); Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U.
L. REV. I, 19- 35 (2012) (arguing that the European Union unilaterally globalizes its regulations and identifying this "Brussels effect" as a global variant of the "California effect").
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. See infra Part H.B.
42. See infra notes 69- 74 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 69- 74 and accompanying text.
44. Trine Munk-Olsen, Thomas Munk Laursen, Carsten B. Pederson, 0jvind Lidegaard
& Preben Bo Mortensen, Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk ofMental Disorder, 364
NEW ENG. J. MED. 332, 334-36 (2011) (finding, in population-based cohort study of Danish
women, that incidence of psychiatric treatment increased after childbirth, but not abortion);
Julia R. Steinberg, Davida Becker & Jillian T. Henderson, Does the Outcome of a First

Pregnancy Predict Depression, Suicidal Ideation, or Lower Self-Esteem? Data from the
National Comorbidity Survey, 81 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHJATRY 193, 196 (2011) (finding "no differences between women who aborted versus delivered in postpregnancy depression when
controlling for background and economic characteristics, prepregnancy violence experience,
or prepregnancy mental health"). For a more detailed survey of the literature, see infra note 72
and accompanying text.
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recently argued that Congress is best situated to mediate certain sorts of interstate
spillovers, 45 and the dynamic we identify is ripe for such intervention. As we show,
Congress has ample Commerce Clause power to enact a statute designed to prevent
the South Dakota effect. The federal statute we envision would protect doctors not
subject to state-mandated heightened warnings from the imposition of the South
Dakota standard. Alternatively, states could block the South Dakota effect by enacting statutes similar to the federal statute described above.
We should note before proceeding further that a number of scholars have raised
serious constitutional objections to laws like South Dakota's. Among other things,
they argue that these laws violate Casey's requirement that state-mandated warnings
be "truthful and not misleading" 46 and thus constitute an undue burden;47 that they
reveal the "untenability" of the compromise struck in Casey;48 and that they compel
physician speech in violation of the First Amendment. 49 These laws have not been

45. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory ofArticle I, Section 8, 63 STAN . L. REV. 115, 117 (20 l 0) ("[T]he federal government
is more likely than the states to solve the problem of interstate spillovers."); Heather K. Gerken
& Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REv. 57,
108 (2014) ("Congress's lawmaking power makes it a natural choice for those aggrieved by
an interstate spillover and seeking a referee."); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV. and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1479, 1531 (2007)("[T]he Constitution assigns
the primary role of interstate umpire to Congress .. . . Assigning Congress [this] role .. . not
only reflects constitutional text and structure, but also furthers federalism values and has some
historical support.").
46. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality opinion).
4 7. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social
Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. I, 26 (2008) ("[I]n light
of what we now know about the effect of fear appeals and persuasion under the influence of
anxiety, there is a legitimate case for closer scrutiny under Casey of the effect such Stateprovided information has on the decision-making of women seeking abortion .... "); Rebecca
Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1621 (2008) ("Casey's standard calls into question state mandates to
warn women considering abortion about unfounded hazards, such as ... serious psychological
problems."); Siegel, supra note 16, at 1758 (arguing that much of Casey aligns with "ordinary
informed consent practice .. . designed to facilitate a patient's consideration of risks and benefits of the treatment decision and its alternatives, presented in a balanced and even-handed
way" and suggesting that regulation inconsistent with such principles may constitute an "undue burden"); see also, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, Informed Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis
Pregnancy Centers, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51 ,
56 (2015) ("For poor women ... the mandatory counseling and waiting period laws increase
the personal and financial costs of obtaining an abortion and prevent women from accessing
abortion services."); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden
Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 1054-56 (2014) (criticizing courts for allowing
compliance with Casey standards to preempt every constitutional challenge to abortion
regulation).
48. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of
Women's Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291,324 (2010) ("The 'compromise' that
Casey struck is an untenable one. . .. [It has] encouraged legislatures to pass abortion restrictions in fact based on moral norms but couched as grounded in scientific evidence.").
49. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1290-91
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comprehensively tested in courts, and arguments against their constitutionality may
yet carry the day. Rather than enter that constitutional debate, however, our project
aims to shift the focus to another important aspect of these laws-from their
standalone ( un )constitutionality to a consideration of their interstate effects. 50
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we survey and criticize the
informed-consent statutes of South Dakota and like-minded states. In Part ll, we
identify and examine the South Dakota effect. In Part III, we develop our law-reform
proposals and explain their advantages and shortcomings. A short Conclusion
follows.

I.

SPECIAL INFORMED-CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ABORTION

A. The "Right To Know"
ln Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 51 the Supreme
Court held that states have a legitimate and substantial interest in apprising women
of"the health risks ofabortion,"52 including harm to a woman's "psychological wellbeing."53 Accordingly, it held that states may require doctors to give women

(2014) (arguing that abortion-related disclosure mandates are "out of step with prevailing free
speech jurisprudence"); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J . 1238 (2016)
(theorizing First Amendment protection of professional speech as a freedom of medical and
other professional communities to generate and disseminate knowledge); David Orentlicher,
Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & Ennes 9, 9 (2015) (arguing that
ideology-driven disclosure mandates violate doctors' free speech rights); Robert Post,
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 989 (arguing that South Dakota's depression and suicide warnings
violate the First Amendment insofar as they force physicians "to express views that contradict
and undermine the authority of medical knowledge"); cf Sonia M. Suter, The First
Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
22, 25~28 (2015) (arguing that professional speech in informed-consent context has high value
and that its regulation therefore requires heightened, and at times strict, First Amendment scrutiny); Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1330 (2015)
("[W]hen [the state] engages in an ideological assault on the constitutional right to abortion .. .
the state is no longer simply ensuring that women's informed consent is obtained .... The First
Amendment is not merely 'implicated' when states pass ideological abortion disclosure laws;
it is threatened in unique ways." (footnote omitted)).
50. We should note, in addition, the problematic nature of discussing informed-consent
laws in the register of patient rights and autonomy. Rather than attempt to actually enhance
patients' autonomy, heightened informed-consent requirements aim- in many cases,
overtly-to guide patients toward continuing with their pregnancies. See Maya Manian, The
Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& PoL'Y 223,250 (2009). But given that this is the terrain on which battles over abortion are
being fought, it is useful to think through the effects of these laws within that framework. And
this Article's close examination of such laws reveals their previously unnoticed horizontal
threat to abortion rights.
51. 505 U.S. 833 .
52. Id. at 882 (plurality opinion).
53. Id.
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"truthful, nonmisleading information" about those risks, 54 even when motivated by
a preference for childbirth over abortion. 55 This authorization is controversial
because it allows the government to supersede doctors in producing and
promulgating medical information. 56 Yet at present it is part and parcel of our
constitutional law. 57
Thus far, fourteen states have read Casey to sanction heightened informedconsent requirements for abortion. 58 Those states are Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 59 Though the terms of the statutes to
some extent vary, in each state doctors must inform women about the risk of postabortion depression. 60 Failure to do so will vitiate the patient's consent to the abortion
procedure and expose the doctor to tort liability, as well as disciplinary and sometimes criminal penalties. 61 The bellwether of this trend was South Dakota-a state

54. Id.
55. Id. at 883. In giving this authorization, the Court overruled parts of its decisions in
City ofAkron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,444 (1983) (invalidating "abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth"), and Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (rejecting "[Pennsylvania's) outright attempt to
wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informedconsent dialogue between the woman and her physician"). Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
56. See Steven E. Weinberger, Hal C. Lawrence III, Douglas E. Henley, Errol R. Alden
& David B. Hoyt, Legislative Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship, 367 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1557 (2012).
57. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159---60 (2007) ("The State has an interest in
ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to
regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know .... "). But see supra note
18 (suggesting that the Court's recent opinion in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, No.
15-274 (U.S. June 27, 2016) may reopen the constitutional debate).
58. See infra note 148 and accompanying text and Table I.
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(a)(3), -67IO(a) (Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1061.15 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) {West Supp. 2015);
MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 145.4242, .4243(a)(2) (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 188.039(2), (3)
(West Supp. 2015); MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 50-20-104(5), -304 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-2816, 28-327.0l(l)(b) (LexisNexis 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 90-21.13, .82(1)(b)
(West Supp. 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§§ 34-23A-10.l(l)(e), -1.7 (2011 & Supp. 2015);
Tux. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§§ 171.012(a)(l)(B), 171.014 (Supp. 2015); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-305.5(2)(a), (o) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(F)(3)
(2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-21-3(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 253.IO(l){b)3, (3)(c)l.f {West Supp. 2015); see also, e.g., Tux. DEP'T OF HEALTH, A
WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNOW 16 (2003); Abortion Risks, LA. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HOSPS.,
http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/ I 063/n/27 5
[https://perma.cc/7 ACL-UX CA]
(informing women that abortion might cause "depression, grief, anxiety, lowered self-esteem,
regret, attachment, flashbacks, and substance abuse").
60. See infra note 148 and accompanying text and Table 1.
61. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1.7 (2011) (reaffirming the South Dakota
common-law cause of action for medical malpractice informed-consent claims available
against doctors who fail to warn patients about postabortion depression); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS.
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that since 2005 has statutorily required doctors to warn women not only about the
general risk ofpostabortion depression, but also about the fact that abortion may lead
to ideation of suicide and to actual suicide. 62
In the pages ahead, we focus on statutes mandating that doctors warn patients
about the risk ofpostabortion depression. With one exception, 63 these mandates are
not expressly qualified by Casey's "medically accurate" proviso. Doctors consequently appear to have no choice but to tell every patient that she may develop depression following an abortion. Under the statutory mandates of South Dakota, 64
Louisiana, 65 Michigan, 66 and Wisconsin, 67 doctors must also warn patients that postabortion depression may have serious consequences that may include feelings of
guilt, sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or sex, anger, psychological trauma,
and suicidal thoughts. 68
Unlike the breast-cancer warnings mandated in some states,69 warnings about

§ 34-23A-10.2 (2011) (categorizing violation of South Dakota's disclosure obligations for
doctors as a Class 2 misdemeanor reportable to the Board of Medical Examiners).
62. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34-23A-IO. l(l )(e)(ii) (2011). A number of states also require
women seeking abortions to undergo an ultrasound examination that displays the fetus's image
and heartbeat. See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path
to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REv. 351,351, 393- 96 (2008) (arguing that such laws are
morally reprehensible in that they coercively use a woman's body as a source of information);
see also Stuart v. Carnnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating North Carolina's
mandatory ultrasound law as going well beyond the means "states have customarily employed
to effectuate their undeniable interests in ensuring informed consent and in protecting the sanctity of life"), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015). In addition, the states of Alaska, Kansas,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, and Texas require doctors to highlight the connection between abortion and breast cancer and notify women about that connection when it is "medically accurate." See supra note 21.
63. North Carolina is the exception. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 90-21.82(1)(b) (West Supp.
2014) (requiring a doctor to inform a woman seeking an abortion, "when medically accurate,"
about "any adverse psychological effects").
64. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34-23A-10.1(1 )(e)(ii)(201 l ).
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40: 1061.16,: 1061.17, : 1157.1, : 1157.2 (2016).
66. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015(1 l)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2015).
67. WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 253.IO(l)(b)3, (3)(c)l(f) (West Supp. 2015).
68. Texas's administrative materials (the information booklet distributed by the
Department of Health pursuant to section 171.014 of the Texa~ Health and Safety Code) also
inform women that "[s]ome women have reported serious psychological effects after their
abortion, including depression, grief, anxiety, lowered self-esteem, regret, suicidal thoughts
and behavior, sexual dysfunction, avoidance of emotional attachment, flashbacks, and substance abuse." TEX. DEP'T HEALTH, supra note 59, at 16.
69. See supra notes 21, 62. For literature disclaiming any link between abortion and breast
cancer, see COMM. ON GYNECOLOGIC PRACTICE, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION No. 434, INDUCED ABORTION AND BREAST CANCER
RISK (2009) (refuting unequivocally the connection between abortion and breast cancer risk
and asserting there is "no causal relationship between induced abortion and a subsequent increase in breast cancer risk"); Katherine Delellis Henderson, Jane Sullivan-Halley, Peggy
Reynolds, Pamela L. Hom-Ross, Christina A. Clarke, Ellen T. Chang, Susan Neuhausen,
Giske Ursin & Leslie Bernstein, Incomplete Pregnancy ls Not Associated with Breast Cancer
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postabortion depression are not empirically preposterous. Abortion can be an emotionally taxing event, 70 though it often brings about feelings of relief in the end. 71
Although the experience does not independently drive women into full-blown depression, 72 it may still contribute to depression by aggravating preexisting mental or

Risk: The California Teachers Study, 11 CONTRACEPTION 391, 396 (2008) ("[O]ur results provide . .. strong evidence that neither induced abortion nor miscarriage is associated with breast
cancer risk and may help to resolve any remaining uncertainty as to whether such a relationship
exists."); Gillian K. Reeves, et al., Breast Cancer Risk in Relation to Abortion: Results from
the EPIC Study, I 19 INT'LJ. CANCER 1741, 1744 (2006) ("[T]he findings presented here provide further unbiased evidence for the lack of an adverse effect of induced abortion on breast
cancer risk.").
70. Nancy E. Adler, Henry P. David, Brenda N. Major, Susan H. Roth, Nancy Felipe
Russo & Gail E. Wyatt, Psychological Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1194, 1197 (1992) ("[A]n unwanted pregnancy is ... an event that can be challenging or
stressful. ... Termination of an unwanted pregnancy may reduce the stress .... At the same
time, the abortion itself may be experienced as stressful.").
11. Id. at 1198 ("When women are asked to indicate which emotions they experience
following first-trimester abortion, the most frequent response is to report feelings of relief and
happiness .... "); David A. Grimes & Mitchell D. Creinin, Induced Abortion: An Overview
for Internists, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 620,624 (2004) ("Induced abortion does not harm
women's emotional health; for most women, it allows an overall improvement in quality of
life. Indeed, the most common reaction to abortion is a profound sense of relief" (endnotes
omitted)).
72. Rather, well-designed studies and meta-analyses of the extensive research in the area
refute the claim that abortion causes psychological harm. APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL
HEALTH AND ABORTION, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND
ABORTION, 5-6 (2008), http://www.apaorg/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf
[https://permacc/QYG8-NFTH] ("The best scientific evidence published indicates that among
adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is
no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver that pregnancy." (emphasis in original)); NAT'LCOLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, AcAD. OF
MED. ROYAL COLLS., INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL HEALTH: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF
THE MENTAL HEALTH OUTCOMES OF INDUCED ABORTION, INCLUDING THEIR PREVALENCE AND
ASSOCIATED FACT,ORS 8 (2011), www.aomrc.org.uk/doc_view/9432-induced-abortion-and
-mental-health [https://permacc/L528-956Z] (finding, based on extensive review of existing
studies, that "rates of mental health problems for women with an unwanted pregnancy were
the same whether they had an abortion or gave birth"); Adler et al., supra note 70, at 1198
("[T]he weight of the evidence is that legal abortion as a resolution to an unwanted pregnancy,
particularly in the first trimester, does not create psychological hazards for most women undergoing the procedure."); Vignetta E. Charles, Chelsea 8. Polis, Srinivas K. Sridhara & Robert
W. Blum, Abortion and long-Term Mental Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the
Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 448-49 (2008) {finding that the best studies- well designed and well executed- "suggest[ed] few, if any, differences between aborters and their
respective comparison groups in terms of mental health sequelae"); Brenda Major, Caroline
Richards, M . Lynne Cooper, Catherine Cozz.arelli & Josephine Zubek, Personal Resilience,
Cognitive Appraisals, and Coping: An Integrative Model of Adjustment to Abortion, 14 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 735, 741 (1998) ("Overall, our sample of women did not report high levels of psychological distress I month following their abortions . ... "); Brenda
Major, Commentary, Psychological Implications ofAbortion- Highly Charged and Rife with
Misleading Research, 168 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 1257, 1258 (2003) ("[Well-designed
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emotional conditions. 73 The probability of this scenario is not high, but it is not negligible either.74 This probability therefore cannot be written off completely.

studies establish] that the emotional well-being of women who abort an unplanned pregnancy
does not differ from that of women who carry a pregnancy to term."); Munk-Olsen et al., supra
note 44, at 334- 36 (reporting increase in psychiatric treatment after childbirth, but not abortion); Gail Erlick Robinson, Nada L. Stotland, Nancy Felipe Russo, Joan A. Lang & Mallay
Occhiogrosso, Is There an "Abortion Trauma Syndrome "? Critiquing the Evidence, 17 HARV.
REV. PSYCHIATRY 268,276 (2009) ("[P]ublished studies concluding that abortion causes psychiatric illness have numerous methodological problems; since their conclusions are questionable, they should not be used as a basis for public policy."); Steinberg et al., supra note 44, at
196 (finding no psychiatric differences between women who aborted versus delivered); Nada
Stotland, The Myth ofAbortion Trauma Syndrome: Update, 2007, 42 PSYCHJATRJC NEWS 28,
28 (2007) ("[A] growing body of empirical research has demonstrated that abortion does not
cause psychiatric illness."); Carolyn Westhoff, Lucy Picardo & Ellen Morrow, Quality oflife
Following Early Medical or Surgical Abortion, 67 CONTRACEPTION 41, 41 (2003) ("[Results
of original study] provide substantial reassurance that women undergoing abortion experience
a marked improvement in their quality oflife after the abortion."); see also Siegel, supra note
16, at 1719 n.81 (canvassing empirical literature). Two important recent contributions analyze
results from a longitudinal "tum-away study," which compares women who presented at particular clinics and received abortions to women who presented at the same facilities but were
denied abortions because they were just over the applicable state-law gestational limits. D.G.
Foster, J.R. Steinberg, S.C.M. Roberts, J. Neuhaus & M.A. Biggs, A Comparison of

Depression and Anxiety Symptom Trajectories Between Women Who Had an Abortion and
Women Denied One, 45 PSYCHOL. MED. 2073, 2073 (2015) ("Women who received an abortion had similar or lower levels of depression and anxiety than women denied an abortion.");
Corinne H. Rocca, Katrina Kimport, Sarah C.M. Roberts, Heather Gould, John Neuhaus &
Diana G. Foster, Decision Rightness and Emotional Responses to Abortion in the United
States: A longitudinal Study, PLoS ONE, July 8, 2015, at I , 10, http://joumals.plos.org
/plosone/article?id= I 0. 1371 /joumal.pone.0 I 28832 [https://permacc/2FBR-3 YK4] (assessing
women' s emotional reactions to abortion and finding that "at all time points over three years,
95% of participants reported abortion was the right decision").
73 . See Robinson et al. , supra note 72, at 268 ("The most consistent predictor of mental
disorders after abortion remains preexisting disorders . . . ."); Lisa Rubin & Nancy Felipe
Russo, Abortion and Mental Health: What Therapists Need To Know , in FROM MENARCHE TO
MENOPAUSE: THE FEMALE BODY IN FEMINIST THERAPY 69, 74 (Joan C. Chrisler ed., 2004)
("Researchers have identified a number of predictors of women' s mental health after abortion.
The most important is a woman' s previous mental health." (emphasis in original)); see also
Julia H. Littell & James C. Coyne, Correspondence, Abortion and Mental Health: Guidelines
for Proper Scientific Conduct Ignored, 200 BRJT. J. PSYCHIATRY 75, 75- 76(2012) (identifying
eleven methodological flaws in a statistica l study that claimed to have found significant correlation between abortion and mental health problems).
74. See, e.g. , David M. Fergusson, L. John Horwood & Elizabeth M. Ridder, Abortion in
Young Women and Subsequent Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHJATRY 16, 23
(2006) (study identifying depression and suicidal tendencies in young women who underwent
abortion, while acknowledging inability to control for wantedness of the pregnancy and concluding that "the issue of whether or not abortion has harmful effects on mental health remains
to be fully resolved"); Brenda Major, Catherine Cozzarelli, M. Lynne Cooper, Josephine
Zubek, Caroline Richards, Michael Wilhite & Richard H. Gramzow, Psychological Responses
of Women After First-Trimester Abortion, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 777, 777 (2000)
(reporting that a small percentage of women, especially those with prior history of depression,
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Whether the prospect of postabortion depression is significant enough to be included in doctors' disclosure obligations to patients, however, is an altogether separate question. Every medical procedure involves risks. The multitude and variety of
those risks make it impossible for doctors to give their patients complete information
about every risk of harm. Moreover, even if doctors were to give patients full information, the information's complexity would make it impossible for the patients to
properly evaluate its significance. 75 Some risks associated with a patient's treatment
must therefore remain undisclosed.
Separating those remote risks from the information that doctors must disclose to
their patients is not easy. This choice depends on how the policy maker values individual autonomy relative to efficiency. 76 Policy makers who place more value on
autonomy demand that doctors disclose to patients as much information as possible.
Such disclosure, so goes the argument, makes a patient better informed about available treatments, which enables her to choose the treatment she really wants. Policy
makers who prefer efficiency over autonomy allow the medical profession to select
the information that patients should receive. Arguably, this selective disclosure
streamlines the provision of medical care while still allowing the patient to choose
the treatment that fits her needs.
These conflicting viewpoints are reflected in the split between states that base
their informed-consent requirements on doctors' customs and jurisdictions that extract those requirements from patients' expectations. Thirty states base doctors'
informed-consent obligations-in general or specifically with respect to abortion
-on customs and practices of the medical profession. 77 This approach standardizes
informed-consent obligations and makes them easy to comply with, which gives doctors more time to actually treat patients. By adopting the "doctors' custom" standard,
states therefore value efficiency in the provision of medical care over patients'
autonomy. The other twenty states and the District of Columbia require doctors'

experience post-traumatic stress disorder and psychological problems postabortion); see also
Priscilla K. Coleman, Catherine T. Coyle, Martha Shuping & Vincent M. Rue, Induced

Abortion and Anxiety, Mood, and Substance Abuse Disorders: Isolating the Effects ofAbortion
in the National Comorbidity Survey, 43 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 770 (2009); Willy Pedersen,
Abortion and Depression: A Population-Based Longitudinal Study of Young Women, 36
SCANDINAVIAN J. Pus. HEALTH 424, 424 (2008) (finding increased rates of depression for
Norwegian women in their twenties who undergo abortions). But see Robinson et al., supra
note 72, at 275 ("[I]n order to get an abortion in New Zealand, one must prove to two specialist
consultants that the pregnancy would seriously harm the life, physical, or mental health of the
woman, that the woman is severely mentally handicapped, or that the pregnancy was the result
of rape or incest. These conditions suggest an inclusion bias [in Fergusson's work] toward
vulnerable, high-risk women in the abortion group."); infra note 108 (noting extensive criticism of Coleman).
75. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARLE. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN You WANTED
To KNow: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE I 07- 18 (2014) (explaining how overflow
of information distorts decisions).
76. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899
(1994) (describing informed-consent doctrine as a tension between patients' autonomy right
and doctors' interest in self-regulation).
77. See infra notes 148- 50 and Table I.
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provision of information to patients to satisfy a "reasonable patient's" expectation. 78
This requirement expands doctors ' disclosure obligations beyond the information
that the medical profession deems material.
The two standards overlap along two important dimensions. First, doctors' customs integrate the legal requirement that it is the patient who must ultimately decide
whether to undergo a particular procedure, with the doctor helping the patient choose
wisely. 79 Second, and equally important, because the "patient expectation" standard
honors only reasonable expectations, doctors have no obligation to reveal information that their profession considers wholly irrelevant or, worse, detrimental to the
patient's treatment. 80 Doctors' customs thus shape patients' expectations and are affected by them at the same time. 81
This dialectic brings the "doctors' custom" and "patient expectation" standards
close to each other. Both standards require doctors to inform patients about the nature, risks, and benefits of the recommended procedure and its medically approved
altematives. 82 The differences between the two standards relate to peripheral information, including doctors' performance records, medically inferior procedures, and
remote risks. Under the "patient expectation" standard, physicians may be obligated
to inform patients about their past performance and rate of success in carrying out
the procedure in question. 83 The "doctors' custom" standard, on the other hand, does
not recognize this far-reaching disclosure obligation.84 The "patient expectation"
standard also sometimes requires doctors to tell patients about procedures doctors

78. See infra notes 148- 50 and Table I.
79. Schuck, supra note 76, at 924 ("The most fundamental normative argument in favor
of requiring health care providers to obtain patients' informed consent to medical treatments
proceeds from the principle of autonomy- the notion that each mature individual has a right
to make the basic choices that affect her life prospects."); id. at 916 ("Physicians may not deal
with their patients at arm's length; they owe their patients a fiduciary duty, which includes an
obligation to act exclusively in the patient's interests and to disclose all information material
to those interests.").
80. But the patient can ask questions that must be answered truthfully. See, e.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. § 147.137(2) (West 2014) (entitling patients to ask doctors questions and receive
satisfactory answers); 25 Tux. ADMIN. CODE § 601.4 (2015) (same).
81 . For that reason, we separate the two approaches by their three functional differences
as specified below.
82. See Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1201 , ·
1232 & n.166 (2012) (summarizing the informed-consent requirement and citing relevant
authorities).
·
83. Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 717 (Md. 2006) (holding that a surgeon' s inexperience presents a jury issue of whether informed consent was given); Johnson ex rel Adler
v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 505-06 (Wis. 1996) (requiring doctors to reveal their past
records). For analysis of this rule, see Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second
Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. I
(1999).
84. See, e.g., Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) ("[D]efendants, as a matter oflaw, did not have a duty to disclose Dr. Cohn's statistical history of transplant failures to obtain the decedent's informed consent."); cf Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15,
20-22 (Conn. 2006) (holding that Connecticut's so-called "patient expectation" standard does
not require doctors to disclose prior experience with procedures).
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consider inferior or of which they disapprove. 85 Examples of such procedures include
vaginal breech delivery as a substitute for a broadly recommended C-section86 and a
risky bone surgery instead of bed rest. 87 The "doctors' custom" standard exempts
doctors from the duty to notify patients about such inferior treatment options. 88
The "doctors' custom" standard also relieves doctors of the obligation to inform
patients about remote risks ofharm. 89 For example, an orthopedic surgeon does not
have to tell a patient contemplating spinal cord surgery that one in one thousand
patients undergoing a similar surgery becomes paralyzed after falling on the floor
from his bed. 90 Courts applying the "patient expectation" standard see things differently. In the oft-cited "patient expectation" precedent Canterbury v. Spence,91 the
court ruled that doctors must inform patients about small chances of death or severe
incapacitation. 92 The gravity of the potential harm makes such disclosure mandatory
even where the chances are quite remote. 93 Based on this understanding of the law,

85. See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 460-64 (N.J. 1999) (holding that
"patient expectation" standard authorizes jurors to hold doctors liable for failure to disclose
nonrecommended medical alternatives).
86. See, e.g., William M. Gilbert, Shauna M. Hicks, Nina M. Boe & Beate Danielsen,
Vaginal Versus Cesarean Delivery for Breech Presentation in California: A Population-Based
Study, 102 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOOY 911, 911 (2003) (demonstrating empirically that
normal-term breech fetuses have significantly increased neonatal mortality and morbidity
when delivered vaginally relative to a C-section).
87. Matthies, 733 A.2d at 458-60.
88. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 2d 18, 34 (D. Me. 2010) ("Because
modem medicine no longer recognizes as reasonable the surgical resection of a colon tumor
for someone in [the patient's] condition, explaining this alternative [to the patient was not
required under Maine's "doctors' custom" standard]."); Taylor v. County of Cook, 957 N.E.2d
413, 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding under Illinois's "doctors' custom" standard that the
court below "did not err in stating what [the patient] would or would not have done had she
received information about alternative treatments was irrelevant since the standard to base the
treatment decision upon is an objective and not a subjective standard").
89. See, e.g., Bronneke v. Rutherford, 89 P.3d 40, 46 (Nev. 2004) (holding under "doctors' custom" standard that reasonable chiropractor need not inform patient about risk of stroke
that amounts to one in 5,850,000); see also BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA
H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 217- 18 (7th ed. 2013) (attesting that doctors' custom standard
does not obligate doctors to tell patients about remote risks).
90. This example draws on Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a case
decided under the "patient expectation" standard.
91. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 788 ("A very small chance of death or serious disablement may well be significant .... "); see also, e.g., Martin ex rel Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Wis. 1995)
(attesting that "courts have . . . been quick to recognize that although the risk of a complication
may be small, such risk may be significant to a patient's decision in light of the potentially
severe consequences" (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788)).
93. See, e.g., Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming
Canterbury's requirement that a patient be informed about "a one percent chance of very serious consequential harm"); McKinney v. Nash, 174 Cal. Rptr. 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that, prima facie, doctors must inform patients about a one in I000 risk of testicular atrophy
due to vascular damage caused by hernia repair operation); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher,
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the Canterbury court concluded that the surgeon in our above-mentioned example
had violated the patient's right to informed consent. 94
Doctors' duty to inform patients about improbable but serious harms marks the
baseline for assessing the effects of mandatory warnings about postabortion depression. Depression resulting from abortion is a low-probability event in and of itself.
Cases in which abortion renders a woman deeply depressed or suicidal have an even
lower probability. But proponents of postabortion depression warnings do not see
this as a problem. They believe that these warnings are socially desirable as a means
of dissuading women from choosing abortion. This justification, however, has a constitutional limit: information that doctors communicate to patients cannot be misleading. Misinforming a woman about the abortion's consequences in order to convince her to keep an unwanted pregnancy is quite clearly unconstitutional under
Casey.gs
For that reason, many proponents of postabortion depression warnings have abandoned arguments that are transparently motivated by antiabortion paternalism and
instead have begun appealing to women's individual autonomy. These proponents
argue that warnings are warnings: all they do is give women more information about
abortion as part of their "right to know." 96 This information enhances a woman's
choice and control over her destiny. After receiving this information, some women
may feel uncomfortable about the depression prospect, even when its probability is
low. They may want to eliminate this prospect completely by calling the abortion off.
Other women may decide not to worry about serious but low-probability scenarios
and go ahead with the abortion procedure. Arguably, therefore, warnings about postabortion depression have only an upside and no downside. By giving women more
information, they enhance women's autonomy without restricting access to abortion.
This argument has some intuitive appeal. Part of its appeal lies in the fact that

553 So. 2d 398, 403 (La. 1988) ("Canterbury notes that there is no bright line separating a
significant from an insignificant risk. Disclosure has been required when there was a three
percent chance of death, paralysis or other injury, and when there was a one percent chance of
loss of hearing. Nondisclosure has been justified when there was a 1.5% chance of loss of an
eye and a one in l 00,000 chance of death." (citing, respectively, Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So.
2d 888 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1963); Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
ajf'd, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); Yeates v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982 (Kan. 1964); and Pauscher
v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987)) (footnotes omitted)); Long v.
Jaszczak, 688 N. W.2d 173, 179- 80 (N.D. 2004) (holding that an undisclosed one in 40,000 to
one in 150,000 risk of allergic reaction and death from intravenous pyelogrnm makes a triable
issue of informed-consent violation); see also Moore v. Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479,496 n.41 (C,al. 1990) ("One cannot know with certainty whether a consent is valid until a
lawsuit has been filed and resolved."); Jon F. Merz, An Empirical Analysis of the Medical
Informed Consent Doctrine: Search for a "Standard" of Disclosure, 2 RISK 27, 42 ( 1991)
("[N]o physician can absolutely avoid liability under the informed consent laws unless he or
she discloses every known risk ....").
94. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786--88.
95. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,883 (1992).
96. See Siegel, supra note 16, at 1706 (observing that "advocates of incremental and absolute abortion restrictions have increasingly come to justify such regulation in the frames of
their opponents, and now often portray abortion restrictions as promoting women's informed
consent, women's health, women's welfare, and women's freedom").

2016]

ABORTION AND REGULATORY SPILLOVER

19

mandatory warnings about postabortion depression conform with the "patient expectation" standard, which in many states applies to all patients, whatever the procedure,
and not just to women considering abortion. Accordingly, it might appear that the
depression warnings do not single out pregnant women as requiring special paternalistic protection. 97 Indeed, the emergence of the "patient expectation" standard itself
represented courts' rejection of the paternalism with which doctors treated patients
under the "doctors' custom" standard for informed consent. 98
This argument is predicated on the assumption that a person's autonomy increases
with the addition of all new information. In the next section, we show that this assumption is not necessarily true and argue against its introduction into our rules of
informed consent.
B. The Right Not To Know

A person is best positioned to make an important decision when she has full information concerning that decision. From this simple truth people often derive a related, and yet altogether different-as well as fundamentally flawed-proposition
about the value of information. They tend to believe that accumulation ofinformation
related to a person's decision invariably makes the person better informed and brings
her closer to the truth. 99 This belief is flawed for a simple reason: not all information
is trustworthy. Some information might lead a person astray.
An individual with full knowledge of the facts need not filter information for quality. For a person with no such omniscience, however, identifying information as reliable and unreliable is an absolute must in order to determine what information to
heed and what to ignore. Scarcity of time and resources and limits of cognition make
this informational strategy rational and, indeed, necessary for any person. 100 As a
general matter, a rational person will do well to ignore risks that are abstract and
remote. 101
Mandatory warnings about postabortion depression are a case in point. When a
doctor informs a woman that abortion might cause depression in some cases, the
woman might reasonably want to know about the circumstances of those cases in
order to compare those cases with hers. Acquiring that information, however, may
not provide much assistance. Consider a doctor who tells the woman that those rare
cases involved women ','Vith prior psychological or psychiatric problems. This piece
of information obscures more than it illuminates. First, psychological and psychiatric
problems are not created equal and do not affect people in the same way. Second,

97. But see id. at 1773- 80 (unveiling gender paternalism in antiabortion movement's allusions to women's autonomy).
98. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 (associating "patient's expectation" standard with
patient's freedom to decide for herself).
99. Remarkably, Jeremy Bentham relied on this belief in his proposal to abolish all technical rules of evidence. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 122- 33 (2005) (discussing Bentham's evidence theory and exposing its flaws).
l00. See Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 429-34 (2014) (explaining
how evidence law eliminates inefficient information).
IOI. See id. at 435- 39 (developing signal-to-noise criterion for selecting evidence for
trials).
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some of these problems may have been serious enough to cause the depression by
themselves, thus rendering the abortion causally immaterial. Third and equally importantly, psychological and psychiatric problems may also trigger postpartum depression in a woman who delivers a completely healthy baby. 102 These scenarios are
remote, unspecified, and unforeseeable. Factoring them into a specific decision about
abortion can only create an impasse.
We therefore believe that the informed-consent doctrine should exempt doctors
from the obligation to inform all patients about remote risks of harm associated with
the recommended treatment-and in particular, the remote risk of depression without
reference to a woman's individual circumstances. Notifying a patient about such
risks does not enhance her autonomy. In fact, it makes the patient less informed and,
consequently, less autonomous. This is because the information she receives is selective and misleading: it only reveals the remote risks faced by patients who undergo
the recommended treatment. It does not tell the patient about other remote risks, including those she would face if she did not receive the treatment.
Consider again the seminal case Canterbury v. Spence. 103 Assume, counterfactually, that the doctor does tell the patient that in approximately one case out of one
thousand a person undergoing an identical spinal cord surgery becomes paralyzed
after falling from his bed. 104 Would that information help the patient make the right
decision? We do not think so. Consider the risks faced by a person who requires
surgery to fix his back problems but avoids doing it. First, the person's problems may
aggravate over time into a condition that might severely impair his functioning and
perhaps lead to paralysis. 105 Second, the person might get involved in a car accident,
a fight, or a fall that will inflict critical trauma on his untreated back. The combined
probability of these scenarios may well be greater than one in one thousand.
If so, the court in Canterbury should not have stopped at asking doctors to inform
patients about the "surgery, fall, and paralysis" scenario. The court should have also
required that doctors tell patients about equally morbid and equally improbable
scenarios that involve people with untreated back problems. If a patient should know
about one improbable possibility in order to make an autonomous choice of
treatment, then she should also be apprised of all other potential outcomes that fall
within the same realm of possibility. The informed-consent doctrine cannot rationally require doctors to notify patients about just one specific low-probability risk
among many.
A much better alternative would be to exclude all remote scenarios (regardless of
the magnitude of the harm) and focus solely on those scenarios that are likely enough
to materialize in the patient's case. These causally significant scenarios can only be
identified by the medical profession, which analyzes and utilizes the collective experience of doctors.
That said, the Supreme Court's decision in Casey gave states the power to select

102. Stacey A. Tovino, Scientific Understandings ofPostpartum Illness: Improving Health
law and Policy?, 33 HAR.v. J.L. & G ENDER 99, 121 - 22 (2010) (summarizing current multifactorial explanations for postpartum depression).
103. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
104. Id. at 776 (describing patient' s falling accident).
105. See John W. McDonald & Cristina Sadowsky, Spinal-Cord Injury, 359 LANCET 417,
417 (2002) (listing morbid consequences of untreated spinal cord injuries).
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the risks about which doctors should notify patients within their borders. 106 The Court
also held that in exercising that power, states are entitled to implement their preference for childbirth over abortion. 107 For that reason, supporters of mandatory warnings about postabortion depression can claim that our critique of these warnings is
beside the point. Specifically, they can argue that postabortion and postpartum depression, while both unfortunate, are not equal in the eyes of South Dakota and likeminded states. For these states, postpartum depression accompanies the birth of a
living human being- and is therefore a much happier end. These states therefore can
require doctors to tell women about postabortion depression, while leaving the discussion of the postpartum depression risk to doctors' discretion. There is nothing
inconsistent, illogical, or probabilistically irrational in that choice.
Even with the Supreme Court's approval of this general approach, some of the
states' laws sit uneasily with 108 the Court's admonition that such information be
"truthful and not misleading." 109 But rather than assess the constitutionality of these
laws under Casey's proviso, we focus on a different strain of the Supreme Court's
abortion jurisprudence: the premise that the regulation of informed consent is an
intrastate affair. We submit that this premise is mistaken in that it ignores the South
Dakota effect, to which we now turn.
II. THE SOUTH DAKOTA EFFECT
In this part of the Article, we demonstrate that the postabortion depression warnings mandated by South Dakota and like-minded states threaten to spread to other

106. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (plurality opinion).
l07. Id.
108. This transgression is particularly blatant in the state at the center of this piece, South
Dakota, whose statute, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-IO. l(l)(e)(ii) (2011), requires doctors
to warn patients that the abortion might lead to suicide ideation and suicide. But see Plarmed
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 894- 95 (8th Cir. 2012) (en bane)
(upholding the constitutionality of South Dakota's suicide warning as truthful and not misleading). The Eighth Circuit based its conclusion upon studies carried out by Mika Gissler et
al., David Fergusson et al., and the state's expert witness, Dr. Priscilla Coleman. Coleman, et
al., supra note 74; Fergusson et al., supra note 74; Mika Gissler, Elina Hemminski & Jouko
Lonnqvist, Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987- 94: Register Linkage Study, 313 BRIT.
MED. J. 1431 , 1432 (1996). The Rounds decision, however, paid no attention (1) to the fierce
and widespread critique of Coleman's studies, see, e.g., Robinson et al., supra note 73; (2) to
Fergusson's caveat about his research group's inability to control for wantedness of the
aborted pregnancies and his own unwillingness to draw firm conclusions from the study; and
(3) to the failure of Gissler et al. to distinguish between wanted and unwanted pregnancies in
a Scandinavian country where use of contraception is a norm, see AM. PSYCHJATRJC Ass'N,
ABORTION AND WOMEN 'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE RIGHTS 2 (2009). Furthermore,
Gissler's study expressly connected women's suicides to preexisting conditions that included
"low social class, low social support, and previous life events." Gissler et al., supra, at 1434;
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(F)(3) (2014); cf Haupt, supra note 49, at 1297 (developing
theory extending constitutional free-speech protection to professions as "knowledge communit[ies ]" and criticizing Rounds for failure to protect doctors against state-imposed duty to tell
patients that abortion might lead to suicide).
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion); see infra notes 46--49 and accompanying text
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states. This regulatory spillover challenges the conventional assumption that state
laws of informed consent have no effect on other states. As we will show, although
statutes requiring doctors to warn women about postabortion depression are confined
to the borders of the states that enacted them, the change they effect within their
states could infiltrate the informed-consent requirements of other states.

A. Regulatory Spillover
Regulatory spillovers come in a variety of different forms and raise a number of
distinct concerns. An important recent contribution to the literature, by Professor
Heather Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt, describes (though it does not endorse) the conventional wisdom regarding interstate spillovers this way: "[S]tate-generated
spillovers cause interstate friction, generate inefficiencies, undermine the national
marketplace, violate the autonomy of other states, and threaten democracy by preventing citizens of the affected state from choosing their own destinies." 110 This description captures many of the harms-economic and political-that a single state's
activity can inflict upon other states. Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine
Sharkey offer another definition, one that focuses on cost-shifting and the protection
of in-state economic interests: "By 'spillover effects' we simply mean state law that,
by its operation, shifts costs and favors its own citizens while disproportionately affecting out-of-state interests, or, as the economists would have it, imposes externalities on others." 111 Professor Gillian Metzger emphasizes constitutionally grounded
notions of state sovereignty and autonomy in identifying the concerns raised by
spillovers, observing that "state autonomy ... embod[ies] the idea that each state is
free to pursue the policies it believes best, ... free from unwanted interference by its
sister states." 112
These and other scholarly works 113 tend to emphasize intentionality and selfinterest, analogizing state actions to those of self-seeking individuals. Specifically,
they posit that state policies are often deliberately designed to shift economic and
political costs across state lines while retaining benefits in-state. 114

110. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at 62.
111. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REv. 1353, 1371 (2006); see also Cameron O'Brien Flynn & Robin Fretwell Wilson, When
States Regulate Emergency Contraceptives Like Abortion, What Should Guide Disclosure?,
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 72, 77, 82 (2015) (identifying expansion of abortion regulation to
emergency contraceptives as "regulatory spillover"). But see Erin O'Hara O ' Connor & Larry
E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-law Coordination, 11 I MICH. L. REv. 647,660 (2013)
(acknowledging that "[s]pillover problems from extraterritorial regulation can take several
forms").
112. Metzger, supra note 45, at 1513.
113. See, e.g., Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An

Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal
Federalism, 81 DENY. U. L. REV. 289,329 (2003) ("[S]tates should not be able to externalize
costs and internalize benefits, giving benefits to itself or its citizens, but placing part of the
cost on other states or their citizens."); Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts ofLaw and State Competition
in the Product Liability System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617,617 (1992) ("When states can pass laws
whose costs are borne by outsiders, self-interested behavior by each makes all worse off.").
114. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at 70.
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We use the concept of"spillover" more expansively. On our account, regulatory
spillovers encompass any extraterritorial effects of state laws, whether intentional or
unintentional, without reference to purpose or (necessarily) to economic effects.
Moreover, spillovers, as we describe them here, need not provide any benefit t0--0r
even have any impact upon-the citizens of the state whose regulation migrates to
another state. 115 And our focus on the impact of such migrations is less on states qua
states than on citizens of states (primarily, in this instance, on women seeking abortions and physicians who perform abortions).
Our account also differs from the existing writings on regulatory spillovers in
terms of both the spillover's domain and the mechanism through which the spillover
occurs. The South Dakota effect does not operate by affecting manufacturers and
products in a national market, like the California effect. 116 Nor does it trigger an increase in the movement of particular items- marijuana, 117 say, or firearms 118-from
states with laxer regulations to states with more stringent regulations. Rather, its impact is primarily on doctrine and practice. 119

115. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: Tow ARD THE PROTECTION
OF FUND AMENTAL RIGHTS 115 (2009) ("The social and moral policies of one state may have
an impact on people all over the United States .. . . [Among other things,] [t]he abortion policies ... of neighboring states may have an impact on the social fabric of a particular state.");
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense ofthe Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:
Balancing Political Participation and &onomic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX.
L. REv. 1203, 1281 (1997) (proposing refinement to antitrust state-action doctrine "to ensure
that state regulations that adversely affect the economic interests of citizens living outside the
regulating state will be curtailed"); Jason Marisam, The Internationalization of Agency
Actions, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 1909, 1917 (2015) (arguing that, in the international context,
"[r]egulatory spillover effects exist whenever one nation's regulations substantially affect the
well-being of another nation's population").
116. For another illustration of a spillover that results from a single state's dominance on
the relevant market, consider the profound influence of Texas's Board of Education decisions
on the contents of schoolbooks nationwide. As a market for schoolbooks, Texas is "so big and
influential that national publishers tended to gear their books toward whatever it wanted,"
including controversial and scientifically unfounded views about evolution. Gail Collins, How
Texas Inflicts Bad Textbooks on Us, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (June 21 , 2012), http://www.nybooks
.com/articles/archives/20 I 2/jun/21 /how-texas-inflicts-bad-textbooks-on-us/ [https://perma.cc
/KY6F-VNWU]. According to schoolbook publishers, "Given the high cost of developing a
single book, the risk of messing with Texas was high." Id.; see also Gerken & Holtzblatt,
supra note 45, at 79.
117. See Jack Healy, Nebraska and Oklahoma Sue Colorado Over Marijuana law,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/nebraska-and
-oklahoma-sue-colorado-over-marijuana-law.html [https://permacc/ZJ87-KAMB]; see also
Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (mem.) (denying Nebraska and Colorado leave
to file complaint), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/032116zor_ h3ci.pdf
[https://permacc/AF3M-BUSE].
118. See Heather Gerken & James T. Dawson, Living Under Someone Else's Laws,
DEMOCRACY, Spring 2015, at 42, 44 ("When Virginia and Georgia maintain lax gun rules,
firearms flood into New York ... .").
119. The closest analogue to this type of spillover is a hypothetical spread of mandatory
consumer warnings that link cellphones to cancer. Such warnings presently exist only in
Berkeley, California. Carol Pogash, Cellphone Ordinance Puts Berkeley at Forefront of
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B. Interstate Migration of Postabortion Depression Warnings

Against this backdrop, the regulatory spillover we identify results from the interplay between new information pertaining to medical risk and the states' rules of informed consent. In this context, "new information" includes any medical information, whatever its source, which has not yet been endorsed or definitively rejected
by the medical community. As we have explained, rules of informed consent vary
from one state to another: some states base disclosure requirements on doctors' customs, while others align those requirements with a reasonable patient's expectations. 120 The introduction of new information relating to risks affects these standards
differently.
The "patient expectation" standard requires doctors to inform patients about every
factor that might influence a reasonable patient's selection of treatment, including
remote risks of serious harm. 121 This broad disclosure requirement extends to all
medical information that might help a patient choose the right treatment, including
information that comes from out of state. 122 Failure to satisfy this requirement

Radiation Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/us
/cellphone-ordinance-puts-berkeley-at-forefront-of-radiation-debate.html [https://perma.cc
/5KQQ-KEF2] (reporting that the City of Berkeley "passed a measure-not actually backed
by science---requiring cellphone stores to warn customers that the products could be hazardous
to their health, presumably by emitting dangerous levels of cancer-causing radiation").
120. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787--88 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
121. See sources cited supra note 93.
122. For a salient example, see Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1984), a case decided under Washington's "patient expectation" standard. In that case, the
Ninth Circuit found an informed-consent violation in a doctor's failure to notify a pregnant
patient that an anticonvulsant drug, Dilantin, which he prescribed for the patient' s epilepsy,
had been found to correlate with birth defects by a study that appeared in a reputable medical
journal in Great Britain, The lancet. Id. at 519. The court ruled that "the district court did not
err in finding as a fact that a reasonable patient would have considered these risks in deciding
on treatment," id. at 524, and it ended its decision with the following statement of doctrine and
policy:
The [British) article pointed out what are at least potentially material risks. It may
be that those risks had not yet been documented or accepted as a fact in the medical profession. Nonetheless, under the doctrine of informed consent, those risks
should have been disclosed. Medical knowledge should not be limited to what is
generally accepted as a fact by the profession. To hold otherwise would defeat
the purpose of the doctrine, give little weight to exploratory medical research,
and invite impossible line drawing.
Id. at 525; see also Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 870-71 (Miss. 1985) (observing that medical education and training undergo "nationalization" and that information affecting doctors'
standards and practices crosses state boundaries); Kenneth S. Abraham, Stable Divisions of
Authority, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 973 (2009) ("[W]hen the reasonable patient standard
applies to the informed-consent issue, testimony regarding the breach issue under the malpractice and informed-consent counts is likely to come from different sources ...."); George
P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, I IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 116 (2004)
("Other states choose to apply the .. . prudent patient standard of informed consent, thereby
requiring a physician to inform his patient of all sources and degrees of information which an
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exposes the doctor to liability for medical malpractice. 123 As a result, new medical
information, whatever its source, 124 updates doctors' disclosure obligations upon
introduction. 125

average, ordinary, and reasonable patient should and would require in order to make an informed decision regarding the need to submit to a proposed treatment therapy." (emphasis
added)); Twerski & Cohen, supra note 83, at 38 ("[A] provider or MCO [managed care organization] that has risk information in a form from which comparative inferences can be
drawn- whether the MCO developed that information itself or obtained it from another
source, such as the government- has the same duty to disclose this information [to the patient]
as it does to disclose information about risks associated with the procedure."); cf Weekly v.
Solomon, 510 N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that, under Illinois's "doctors'
custom" standard, "the locality rule does not apply to the issue of informed consent" and allowing a physician from Ohio to testify about informed-consent violation by a doctor from
Illinois).
123. See David M. Studdert, Michelle M . Mello, Marin K. Levy, Russell L. Gruen, Edward
J. Dunn, E. John Orav & Troyen A. Brennan, Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law:
Two Standards for Disclosure a/Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 117, 120
(2007) (finding that doctors practicing in "patient expectation" jurisdictions are more than
twice as likely to be held liable for informed-consent violations as physicians working in the
states that follow the "doctors' custom" standard).
124. But compare Spencer v. Seikel, a case in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed the patient's argument that her doctors "had a duty to inform her that abortion, although
prohibited in Oklahoma at her stage of pregnancy, was available in other states." 742 P.2d
1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987). The court distinguished between the national medical standards
Oklahoma doctors must use in treating patients, and the abortion laws of states other than
Oklahoma Id. In the court's words, "searching for legal alternatives is a job more suitable for
lawyers." Id.; see also Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of
Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REv. 261, 335 ( 1999) ("By characterizing abortion
as legally rather than geographically unavailable, the [Spencer] court absolved the physician
of the duty to disclose." (emphasis in original)). The Spencer decision guided the court in a
California appellate case, Schiff v. Prados, which involved a doctor's failure to inform the
patient about a cancer treatment not approved by the FDA and consequently unlawful in
California, but available in Texas. 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171 , 184 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The court ruled
in connection with this failure that,'"even if Texas had allowed [the] treatment . .. , [it] was,
for legitimate policy reasons, outlawed in California. It would be contrary to the public policies
reflected in our cancer treatment statutes to require a physician to discuss treatments those
statutes proscribe." Id. As a general matter, held the court, under California' s "patient expectation" standard laid down in Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P .2d I (Cal. 1972), "a treatment that cannot
legally be administered in this state is not ' available' within the meaning of this rule, and
thus . .. a physician cannot be held liable for failing to disclose the existence of such a treatment." Schiff, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173. This formulation left open the possibility, however,
that California doctors could be obligated to inform patients about out-of-state treatment alternatives not outlawed in California.
125. See Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569, 583- 84 (Haw. 2011) (ruling
under "patient expectation" standard that doctors must disclose to patients "recognized serious
possible risks [and] complications ... involved in the treatment" (quoting Barcai v. Betwee,
50 P.3d 946, 959 (Haw. 2002))); Parker v. Ortiz, No. L--0280--08, 2014 WL 4064801, at *7
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) ("Concerning the risks that must be disclosed by a physician
[under ' patient expectation ' standard], ' [t]he case law is clear. A plaintiff alleging lack of informed consent has the burden of producing expert testimony to establish that the risk cited
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When the source of such information is published studies, and those studies are
contradicted by other studies, this updating may proceed at a slower pace, because
doctors will have conflicting sources of information. Under such circumstances, instead of informing patients about the controversy, doctors will normally wait for further studies that will resolve the conflict. Because they are contradicted by other
studies, controversial studies that link abortion to depression would ordinarily be excluded from routine informed-consent conversations between doctors and patients.
However, the legislative endorsements those studies have received from South
Dakota and thirteen other states alter the landscape. Those studies have now acquired
an official seal of approval. This ratification turns the abortion-depression nexus into
information that reasonable patients might expect to receive. The "reasonable expectation" standard for informed consent consequently may require doctors to give patients this information.
Under the "doctors' custom" standard, by contrast, new medical information does
not automatically update doctors' disclosure obligations. Such updating only occurs
when a substantial number of doctors coalesce around a common practice of providing particular information to patients. Formation of this professional custom is a slow
and incremental process. 126
Doctors, however, have independent incentives to expedite that process and incorporate new information into their disclosure practices without thorough scrutiny.
This incentive is twofold. First, doctors' marginal cost of delivering medical information to patients is low. Adding information to a standard informed-consent form
and briefly explaining it to patients costs doctors very little, yet it practically
eliminates their prospect of being sued for informed-consent violations. 127 Doctors

was one that the defendant should have been aware of because it was known to the medical
community at the time."' (quoting Tyndall v. Zaboski, 703 A.2d 980, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1997))); Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 1229, 1246 (Pa. 2008) (ruling under "patient expectation" standard that doctors must inform patients about "recognized" risks).
126. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 285 (2008) (showing how slow formation of medical and technological customs serving as benchmarks of tort liability discourages innovation).
127. In Karlin v. Foust, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Wisconsin's informed-consent
mandate, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253 . 10(3)(c)l.f (West Supp. 2015), as allowing doctors to accompany the statutory warning that abortion might cause psychological trauma with their own
assessment of the patient's situation., which might rule out the prospect of postabortion depression. 188 F.3d 446, 473 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall,

Government-Scripted Consent: When Medical Ethics and Law Collide, HAsTLNGS CTR. REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 21, 23 (encouraging South Dakota doctors to "contextualize the script,
separating medical fact from legislative conjecture.... In essence, it is the physician's burden
to rehabilitate a counseling process that has been debauched by the South Dakota legislature").
Any such communication, however, could expose the doctor to a malpractice suit that would
accuse him of downplaying the risk of depression. Doctors consequently have a strong incentive not to downplay the warning. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 36, at 545 (attesting
that doctors have strong incentive to "generate evidence that will help them fend off liability
should a malpractice suit be filed against them"); cf Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 737 (8th Cir. 2008) (en bane) (holding that First Amendment does not
require that physicians be given an option to disassociate themselves from postabortion depression warnings when these are truthful and nonmisleading).
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therefore would tend to notify patients about new infonnation even when their
exposure to liability for not doing so is minimal. 128
As importantly, doctors wish to avoid suit for malpractice and informed-consent
violations not only for financial reasons but also because of the reputational consequences of an unfavorable disposition of the suit in a verdict or a settlement. Under
federal law, such verdicts and settlements must be reported to the National
Practitioner Data Bank-a clearinghouse that collects negative infonnation about
doctors and makes it accessible to hospitals and other healthcare organizations. 129
For a risk-averse doctor, eliminating the risk of being sued for malpractice consequently becomes a high priority even when the risk is small. Driven by this incentive,
doctors may relay new information to patients even when there is doubt about the
information's credibility and relevance to the treatment. 130
As the number of such doctors grows, their protocols will begin affecting other
doctors. These other doctors might not fear the prospect of suit as intensely as their
risk-averse colleagues. They might even conclude that the new infonnation is worthless and misleading. Yet, despite their initial disinclination to share the information
with patients, they might nonetheless decide to do so. This strategy would be entirely
rational because the disclosure protocols ofrisk-averse doctors might be interpreted
by courts as a custom, even if they had not actually become one. 131 Furthermore,
companies that insure doctors against malpractice liability have incentives to condition their coverage on doctors' disclosure of all risks associated with a particular
treatment. 132 This may further motivate doctors to include every possible risk in their
patient-infonnation packets and dialogues.
In the case of mandatory warnings about postabortion depression, we anticipate
that this dynamic will unfold in two stages. initially, the warnings will be adopted by
doctors who provide abortion services in jurisdictions following the "patient expectation" standard. To date, those warnings have received the seal of approval from
fourteen states. As we have noted, this state-sponsored infonnation links abortion to
serious harms that include depression, suicidal thoughts, and, as per South Dakota

128. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 36, at 519- 20, 545 (explaining relevant costbenefit tradeotfand applying it to doctors' decisions).
129. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 § 421 , 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2012) (requiring reports on medical malpractice payments); see 42 U.S.C. § I I 135(b) (2012) ("With
respect to a medical malpractice action, a hospital which does not request information respecting a physician or practitioner as required under subsection (a) of this section is presumed to
have knowledge of any information reported under this subchapter to the Secretary with respect to the physician or practitioner."). "A hospital disregarding negative information about
a physician to whom it grants attending privileges exposes itself to suit for negligent credentialing." Astein, Comment to NPDB and Due Process, BILL OF HEALTH (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://biogs. law.harvard.edu/bi llothealth/2013/08/ 12/npdb-and-due-process/ [https://permacc
/CR47-F22G].
130. See Gibson, supra note 37, at 1653---61 (arguing that risk aversion motivates doctors
to take extreme precautions against malpractice liability).
131 . See id. (identifying a similar dynamic in treatments doctors choose to deliver).
132. We attempted to verify this assessment empirically, but insurance companies we contacted declined to reveal their policies.
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law, actual suicide. 133 The probability of those harms is very low, if not negligible. 134
Yet, because this probability is not zero and the harms are serious, doctors in "patient
expectation" jurisdictions may choose to provide patients with these warnings in order to avoid the risk of suit for informed-consent violations. This risk is real, given
the presence of numerous organizations willing to subsidize suits against abortion
providers. 135 And there is evidence that these organizations are actively looking for
opportunities to sue doctors for violating a woman's "right to know" about postabortion depression. 136
Once all "patient expectation" states incorporate the postabortion depression
warning in their doctors' disclosure obligations, the number ofjurisdictions in which
doctors give women this warning will rise from fourteen to thirty-one. Among the
fourteen states that mandate this warning expressly, four states (Minnesota, South
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) follow the "patient expectation" standard for
all medical treatments and procedures. 137 The update of the doctors' disclosure obligations will consequently occur in seventeen "patient expectation" jurisdictions out
of twenty-one. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Washington. 138
This update will mark the beginning of the second and final phase of the South
Dakota effect. Once doctors in thirty-one jurisdictions begin warning women about
the risk of postabortion depression, physicians practicing in the "doctors' custom"
states will gradually follow suit. These physicians will sense the incipient, if not actual, change in the general custom of disclosing information to abortion patients. 139
This will also cause physicians to heed the risk of suit, which they can eliminate at a
very low cost. Importantly, this second update needs to unfold in only twenty out of
the thirty states that follow the "doctors' custom" standard. 140 Ten out of those thirty
states have already aligned themselves with South Dakota by enacting statutes directing doctors to warn women about postabortion depression. 141

133. S.D. CODlFIED LAWS.§ 34-23A-10. l(l)(e)(ii) (2011).
134. See supra note I 08.
135. See Kathryn A. Eidmann, Acuna and the Abortion Right: Constraints on Informed
Consent Litigation, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 262, 262-63 (201 I).
136. Id.
137. See irifra Table I.
138. See infra Table I.
139. There is evidence that physicians are beginning to sense this risk. See Zita Lazzarini,
South Dakota's Abortion &ript- Threatening the Physician- Patient Relationship, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2191 (2008) ("Although some may view South Dakota's restrictive abortion provisions as affecting only the 700 or so women who seek an abortion in that state each
year, such complacency may be misplaced. These provisions mark a substantial inroad into
the physician-patient relationship that ought to worry any practicing physician.").
140. See infra Table I.
141. We estimate that these ten states should include Louisiana as well because it has
adopted a mixed informed-consent standard for procedures other than abortion. See
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 404 (La. 1988) (extending doctors' general
informed-consent obligation to information "material in a reasonable patient's decision to undergo treatment," but limiting it to risks that are "medically known" and "significant" rather
than "rare or remote").
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The global notification about postabortion depression issued by the Planned
Parenthood Federation of America 142 is probably the best real-world illustration of
this dynamic. Planned Parenthood is one of the nation's largest providers of reproductive health and abortion services. 143 It led the constitutional challenge to South
Dakota's informed consent statute-ultimately, without success. 144 Yet even Planned
Parenthood warns women about the possibility ofpostabortion depression. 145 As we
discuss in Part 11.C, the organization links this notification to all of its regional websites, including those that serve branches domiciled in the states following the "doctors' custom" standard for informed consent (and where legislatures have not mandated any abortion-specific warnings). Planned Parenthood thus acts similarly to car
manufacturers who make all of their cars conform to California's emission requirements instead of satisfying the general-and less stringent-EPA standards. 146 The
size and stature of that organization make it reasonable to anticipate that its current
informed-consent practice will affect other doctors as well. To avoid malpractice
suits, those doctors might adopt Planned Parenthood's notification. 147
We summarize this dynamic in Table I and the Figures below:
Table 1. Standards by state

State

Doctors'
Custom

Mandatory Warning
About Postabortion
Depression

Patient
Expectation

Alaska

✓

Arkansas

✓

Colorado

✓

Delaware

✓

142. In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned
parenthood.org/learn/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures [https://permacc/SN4X-G9MY].
143. Who We Are, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us
/who-we-are [https://permacc/UE27-CW7B].
144. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 (D.S.D.
2005) (issuing preliminary injunction against South Dakota informed-consent statute), vacated
en bane, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008), remanded to 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (D.S.D. 2009)
(striking down as unconstitutional suicide proviso in South Dakota informed-consent statute),
ajf'd, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011), rev'd en bane, 686 F.3d 889,906 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding
"no unconstitutional hindrance of the woman's choice" in state-mandated advisory linking
abortion to suicide ideation and suicide).
145. In-Clinic Abortion Procedures, supra note 142.
146. See supra notes 38- 39 and accompanying text.
147. We thank Tom Merrill for drawing our attention to this scenario.
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Patient
Expectation

Florida

✓

Hawaii

✓

Illinois

✓

Iowa

✓

Kentucky

✓

Maine

✓

✓

Massachusetts

✓

Minnesota

Missouri

✓

✓

Nebraska

✓

✓

New Hampshire

✓

✓

New Mexico

North Carolina

✓

Ohio

✓

Oregon

✓

Rhode Island

✓

South Dakota
Texas

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
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Patient
Expectation

✓

✓

Washington

Wisconsin

Figure t. Starting point: Mandatory-warning states

✓

✓
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Figure 2. Stage I : Mandatory warnings spread to patient-expectation states

Figure 3. Stage 2: Mandatory warnings take hold nationwide
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In compiling the table and figures, we relied on the states' statutory provisions
and case law. 148 In line with our Article's goal, Table 1 juxtaposes the special

148. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 18.05.032(a)(7), .16.060(b)(2) (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(A)(l)(c) (Supp.
2015); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 20-16-1703(b)(l)(B)(Supp. 2015); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10
(Cal. 1972) (in bank) (holding that reasonable patient's expectation standard applies in
California); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/HealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571 , 587 (Colo.
2004) (holding that "doctors' custom" standard applies in Colorado); Logan v. Greenwich
Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294,299 (Conn. 1983) (holding that reasonable patient's expectation
standard applies in Connecticut); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(a)(l)--(2) (2015); Shapira v.
Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 99 A.3d 217, 221 - 22 (Del. 2014) (explaining that "doctors' custom" standard applies in Delaware pursuant to title 18, section 6852(a)(2) of the
Delaware Code); Miller- McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 439 (D.C. 2007) (citing
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (holding that reasonable patient's
expectation standard applies in the District of Columbia); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.0111(3)(a)(l)(a) (West Supp. 2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9-6.1 , -9A-3(1), (2012);
HAW. REv. STAT.§ 671-3(b) (West Supp. 2014); Cuc Thi Ngov. Queen's Med. Ctr., 358 P.3d
26, 37(Haw. 2015) (reaffirming Carr v. Strode and "patient expectation" standard for Hawaii);
Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (Haw. 1995) (holding that reasonable patient's expectation
standard applies in Hawaii); IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 18-604(7), 18-609(2)(c), 39-4506 (Supp.
2015); Xeniotis v. Cynthia Satko, D.D.S., M.S., P.C., 14 N.E.3d 1207, 1213 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014) (explaining that in Illinois, "[a] doctor must disclose the risks that a reasonable medical
professional would have disclosed under similar circumstances" and that "[t]he failure of the
physician to conform to the professional standard of disclosure must be proven by expert medical evidence"); Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) (reaffirming in abortion case that "doctors' custom" standard applies in Illinois); IND.
CODE§ 16-34-2-1.1 (Supp. 2015); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 101-04 (Ind. 1992)
(holding that reasonably prudent physician standard applies to informed consent cases in
Indiana); Kennis v. Mercy Hosp. Med. Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1992) (holding that
reasonable patient's expectation standard applies in Iowa); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med.
Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 1987) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 656709(a)(3), -6710(a)(3) (Supp. 2014); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960)
(holding that "doctors' custom" standard applies in Kansas); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§311.725(1)(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1061.17 (Supp. 2016);
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 404---05 (La. 1988) (interpreting Louisiana statute
as adopting "doctors' custom" standard); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599-A (2004); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905(1)(A)-(C), (2) (2015) (codifying "doctors' custom" standard
for Maine); Ouellette v. Mehalic, 534 A.2d 1331, 1332 (Me. I 988) (holding that "doctors'
custom" standard applies in Maine); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1129- 30 (Me.
1980) (same); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 1977) (holding that reasonable
patient's expectation standard applies in Maryland); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S
(LexisNexis 2004) (indicating possible shift to "doctors' custom" standard with respect to
abortion); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240,243 (Mass. 1982) (holding
that reasonable patient's expectation standard applies in Massachusetts); MlCH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.17015(1 l)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2015); Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 20
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that "doctors' custom" standard generally applies in
Michigan); MfNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.4242, .4243(a)(2) (West 2011); Cornfeldt v. Tongen,
295 N. W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980) (holding that reasonable patient's expectation standard
applies in Minnesota); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 701---02 (Minn. 1977) (same);
MISS. CODE ANN.§ 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (West 2007); Whittington V. Mason, 905 So. 2d 1261,
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abortion-related warnings of South Dakota and similar states against the
informed-consent requirements for abortion procedures in other states. These other

1266 (Miss. 2005) (realigning Mississippi informed-consent law with "doctors' custom"
standard); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2)-(3) (West Supp. 2015); Aiken v. Clary, 396
S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965) (holding that "doctors' custom" standard generally applies in
Missouri); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-104(5), -304 (2015); Negaard v. Estate of Feda, 446
P.2d 436, 441 (Mont. 1968) (holding that "doctors' custom" standard generally applies in
Montana); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.0 I (I )(b )(LexisNexis 20 I 5); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-2816 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 41A.I IO (LexisNexis 2012); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.253 (LexisNexis 2015); Folger v. Corbett, 394 A.2d 63, 64 (N.H.
I 978) (holding that "doctors' custom" standard generally applies in New Hampshire);
Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 462 (N.J. 1999) (holding that reasonable patient's
expectation standard applies in New Jersey); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 509 (N.J.
1988) (per curiam) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. UJI § 13-1104B (2015); N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH
LAW § 2805-d(I) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-21.13(a), -21.82(l)(b)
(West Supp. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02(11) (Supp. 2015) (setting up
"doctors' custom" standard for informed consent to abortion); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.56 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-738.2, .3 (West 2015)
(setting forth informed-consent requirement for abortions in Oklahoma using medical
profession's standard); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (2013); Macy v. Blatchford, 8 P.3d 204,210
(Or. 2000) (en bane); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 3205(a)(l) (West 2015); 40 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 1303.504(b) (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-4.7-3 (2008);
S.C. CODE ANN.§ 44-41-20 (2002); S.D. CODrFIED LAWS§§ 34-23A-1.7, -10. l(l)(e)(2011 &
Supp. 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (2012); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 74.103 (201 I) (establishing "doctors' custom" standard for Texas by authorizing panels of
experts to determine and promulgate doctors' disclosure obligations to patients); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012(a)(l)(B), .014 (West Supp. 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 767-305.5(2)(a), (o) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-406 (LexisNexis
2012) (limiting doctors' disclosure obligations to "substantial and significant" risks, thus
effectively aligning them with "doctors' custom" standard); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P .2d 93, 98
(Utah 1982) (reaffirming Utah' s "settled general rule" that "[t]he physician must inform the
patient of all substantial and significant risks which might occur; yet he need not advise the
patient of every conceivable risk"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 1909(a)(I) (Supp. 2015); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(F)(3) (2014) (Virginia' s special informed-consent requirements for
abortion); Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. 1994) (holding that "doctors' custom"
standard generally applies in Virginia); Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. 1976) (same);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.050(2) (West Supp. 2015); Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975
P.2d 950, 956 n.3 (Wash. 1999) (holding that reasonable patient's expectation standard applies
in Washington); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-21-3(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011 ); Adams v. El-Bash,
338 S.E.2d 381 , 385- 86 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that reasonable patient's expectation standard
generally applies in West Virginia); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 455 (W. Va 1982)
(same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(1 )(b)3, (3)(c)l.f (West Supp. 2015); Johnson e.x rel. Adler
v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 501 n. 16 (Wis. 1996) (holding that reasonable patient's
expectation standard generally applies in Wisconsin); Havens v. Hoffman, 902 P.2d 219,222
(Wyo. 1995) (holding that "doctors' custom" standard generally applies in Wyoming); Roybal
v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112 (Wyo. 1989) (same). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H- 12.8 (West
Supp. 2015) (subjecting general hospitals in New Jersey to "doctors' custom" standard);
Peterson v. Shields, 652 S. W.2d. 929, 931 (Tex. 1983) (holding that disclosures not addressed
by the state's statutory Medical Disclosure Panel will be governed by the "patient expectation"
standard).
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states' requirements are predominantly the same for abortion and for other medical
procedures. Nine states, however, have designed special informed-consent
requirements for abortion that substitute the generally applicable "doctors' custom"
standard with the "patient expectation" standard, 149 or vice versa. 150
Our figures summarize the two-stage proliferation of postabortion depression
warnings. At stage one, as those warnings proliferate in the seventeen "patient expectation" jurisdictions that presently do not mandate them, the number of jurisdictions in which doctors warn patients about postabortion depression grows from
fourteen to thirty-one. This increase makes postabortion depression warnings customary. At stage two, doctors practicing in the remaining twenty jurisdictions update
their disclosure obligations in accordance with this emerging custom.
As we noted at the outset, the South Dakota effect is similar to the California
effect in one important respect: both effects involve globalization of a local standard.
This similarity, however, is the only thing that the two effects have in common. The
activities and incentives that produce those effects differ critically, and policy makers
should be aware of those differences as well. The California effect is brought about
by actors' responses to two incentives: economic attractiveness of the local market
and the high cost of dual regulatory compliance. 151 These incentives lead to

149. ALA. CODE§ 26-23A-4(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (substituting general "doctors' custom" standard, adopted in Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Ala. 1985) (per curiam), with
"patient expectation" standard for abortion procedures in Alabama); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-2153(A)(l)(c) (2014) (substituting general "doctors' custom" standard, adopted in
Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d I 052, I 054 (Ariz. 1975), with "patient expectation" standard for
abortion procedures in Arizona); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 20-16-1703 (b)(l)(B) (2015) (substituting
general "doctors' custom" standard, previously codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-l 14206(b)(I) (2015), with "patient expectation" standard for abortion procedures in Arkansas);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(3)(a)(l)(a) (West Supp. 2016) (substituting general "doctors'
custom" standard, codified in FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 766.103 (West 2011) and described in In re
Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Case- Report No. 12-.fJI, 30 So.3d 5%, 606 (Fla. 2013)
(per curiam), with "patient expectation" standard for abortion procedures in Florida); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 31 l.725(1)(a)(I) (LexisNexis 2011) (substituting general "doctors' custom"
standard, adopted in Keel v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 842 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Ky. 1992),
with "patient expectation" standard for abortion procedures in Kentucky); see also Sargent v.
Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198 (Ky. 2015) (attesting that under Kentucky law, informed consent is
generally determined by doctors' customary practice).
150. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02(1 !)(Supp. 2015)(substituting general "patient
expectation" standard, adopted in Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 638 N. W.2d I, 8- 9 (N.D. 2002), with
"doctors' custom" standard for abortion procedures in North Dakota); OH10 REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.56 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2015) (substituting general "patient expectation" standard, adopted in Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Ohio 1985), with "doctors' custom" standard for abortion procedures in Ohio); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-738.2, .3
(Supp. 2016) (laying down special informed-consent requirement for abortions in Oklahoma
that uses medical profession's standards while overriding the general "actual patient's expectation" approach adopted by Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557- 59 (Okla. 1979)); R.I. GEN.
LA ws § 23-4. 7-3 (2008) (substituting general "patient expectation" standard, adopted in Miller
v. Rhode Island Hospital, 625 A.2d 778, 783- 85 (R.I. 1993), with "doctors' custom" standard
for abortion procedures in Rhode Island).
15 I. These incentives are best explained in Anu Bradford's discussion of the Brussels
et\fect, the European cousin of the California effect. Bradford, supra note 39, at 17 ("The
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productive activities that benefit society (e.g., manufacture of cars that minimize
damage to the environment). 152 Activities that produce the South Dakota effect, on
the other hand, are completely divorced from productivity. Far from being welfare
enhancing, those activities instill in abortion patients unnecessary fear and anxiety
that may undermine their ability to make informed choices.
C. Empirical Evidence

Thus far, our discussion of the South Dakota effect has been theoretical. We have
not raised, let alone answered, the question of whether the antiabortion statutes of
South Dakota and like-minded states have to date caused doctors from other jurisdictions to change their behavior.
This question is undeniably important, but we cannot provide a definite answer.
The absence of information about doctors' confidential communications with abortion patients and the inaccessibility of informed-consent forms for abortion prevent
us from doing so. We do, however, provide a tentative answer. First, we show that
suits against doctors for failure to inform patients about possible postabortion depression have become a real threat in the post-Casey world. Second, we examine the
information given to prospective patients by one of the nation's largest providers of
reproductive health services and abortion: the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. 153
The Casey decision did not merely approve special informed-consent requirements for abortion. 154 It also appeared, at least to some, to credit the view that the
risk of postabortion depression is real. 155 This prompted an experienced practitioner
to publish an article warning abortion doctors about their potential liability for failure

exporter has an incentive to adopt a global standard whenever its production or conduct is
nondivisible across different markets or when the benefits of a uniform standard due to scale
economies exceed the costs of forgoing lower production costs in less regulated markets.").
152. Cf id. at 64 (observing that self-globalizing, but ill-designed, regulations erode social
welfare).
153. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org [https://penna.cc'C68Y-X91-13].
154. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,883 (1992).
155. Id. at 882 (crediting the possibility that "a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed"); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) ("While we find no reliable
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. ... Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow." (citation omitted)). For a markedly different perspective,
see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Maternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it."). For scholarship raising concerns about this sort of Supreme Court factual claim, see Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting
Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2012) (critiquing Supreme Court's
"in-house" fact finding and citing, as an example, the Court's factual claims in Carhart regarding "the emotional consequences of abortions generally"). See also Jeannie Suk, The
Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1200 (20 I 0) (tracing roots of idea of "abortion trauma" in Carhart).
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to infonn patients about that risk. 156 The article argued that doctors must infonn patients about possible postabortion depression under both "doctors' custom" and
"patient expectation" standards. 157
This idea came to occupy the agenda of organizations that use medical malpractice suits as an antiabortion weapon. 158 Unsurprisingly, this weapon became particularly popular after Casey. 159 Reporting suggests that a number of plaintiffs funded
by antiabortion organizations sued doctors for failure to infonn the plaintiffs about
postabortion depression. 160 One of those organizations apparently developed and
distributed a manual for attorneys that explained how to file such suits. 161 There is,
however, very limited public infonnation about such suits. Our research has
uncovered only three suits that have been litigated to judgment and ended in
published decisions. One of those suits, Acuna v. Turkish, 162 has been the subject of
extensive public and scholarly attention. 163 The other two, Perez v. Park Madison
Professional laboratories 164 and Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chicago Area, 165 are
far less known. 166
In Acuna, the plaintiff tied her alleged emotional distress to the realization that
she had killed an "existing human being" by having an abortion. 167 She claimed that

156. Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion Psychological
Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639 (1996).
157. Specifically, it claimed that
a physician's withholding of important information on the risks of potential
harmful psychological and emotional consequences arising from an abortion, absent significant justifying factors, will be viewed . . . as usurping the patient's
right to informed consent. ... [W]e may expect a generally uniform response in
both patient and professional rule jurisdictions to the problems of how and to
what extent the patient should be informed of potential emotional and psychological problems.
Id. at 666.
158. See Eidmann, supra note 135, at 268; Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts:
Enhancing the Common-law Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
489, 494 ("There are increasing indications that abortion malpractice litigation is on the rise.
At least some of that litigation, moreover, may stem from pro-life advocates attempting to
dissuade doctors from performing abortions.").
159. Eidmann, supra note 135, at 268 (reporting that "[a]bortion malpractice strategies became increasingly popular in the mid- I 990s" and providing examples).
160. Id. at 272- 73 .
161. Id.
162. 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007); Acuna v. Turkish, 915 A.2d 1045 (N.J. 2007), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 825 (2007).
163. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 47, at 1603--04 (discussing Acuna and its implications);
Eidmann, supra note 135 (same); Manian, supra note 50, at 261 & n.261 (same); Nadia N.
Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y I, 15 & n.52 (2011) (same).
164. 630 N.Y.S.2d 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
165. 956 N .E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011 ).
166. See also Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1035, 1038 (Kan. 1990) (affirming dismissal of patient's suit for doctor's failure to warn her about emotional distress originating
from abortion carried out to eliminate life-threatening risks in continuing the pregnancy).
167. 930 A.2d at 418.
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her physician ought to have informed her of this but failed to do so, thereby violating
her informed-consent right.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled for the defendant. It reasoned that the plaintiff's view of the embryo as an "existing human being" was not a medical fact but rather
a "moral, theological, or philosophical" proposition. 168 For that reason, the court held
that a patient-even in a "patient expectation" state like New Jersey-could not
reasonably expect doctors to tell her that an embryo is an existing human being. 169
The Acuna court acknowledged the existence of the South Dakota statute requiring doctors to inform patients that abortion terminates the life "of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being." 170 The court declined, however, to import the South
Dakota view of abortion into the New Jersey doctrine of informed consent. This decision was motivated by the court's unwillingness to include information it deemed
"nonmedical" in doctors' disclosure obligations. 171
Importantly, the court also noted that
[p]laintiff has not pointed out whether even a small minority of physicians currently give such instructions. Plaintiff has not directed us to any
jurisdiction or any court that has found a common law duty requiring
doctors to tell their pregnant patients that aborting an embryo is the killing of an existing human being-an instruction suggesting that both the
doctor and patient would be complicit in committing the equivalent of
murder. 172
This decision consequently leaves open the possibility that future plaintiffs might
claim that they have been improperly denied medical information about the low probability ofpostabortion depression. Under New Jersey's "patient expectation" standard, reaffirmed by the Acuna court, 173 doctors must give patients medical information
that covers low-probability scenarios and nonrecommended treatment options. 174
Such information may well originate from another state: all that matters is the information's medical nature. This understanding of Acuna may prompt cautious doctors
to include the postabortion depression possibility in their patient-information packets.
Our projection that informed-consent laws might take this path is bolstered by the
Perez case, in which a New York appellate court applied New York's "doctors'

168. Id. at 425- 26 ("Clearly, there is no consensus in the medical community or society
supporting plaintiff's position that a six- to eight-week-old embryo is, as a matter of biological
fact- as opposed to a moral, theological, or philosophicaljudgment- ' a complete, separate,
unique and irreplaceable human being' or that terminating an early pregnancy involves 'actually killing an existing human being."').
169. Id. at 426.
170. id. at 427 (acknowledging S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34-23A- 10. l(l)(b), (d)(201 I)).
17 l. Id. at 425- 26.
172. Id. at 427.
173. Id. at 425.
174. For example, in Matthies v. Mastromonaco, the court ruled that it might have been
reasonable for an elderly osteoporotic patient to expect her doctor to inform her about an operation that required installation of bone screws and was contraindicated for patients in her
condition. 733 A.2d 456, 459,464 (N.J. 1999).
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custom" standard. 175 This case involved a twenty-four-year-old woman who
underwent a second-trimester abortion procedure. 176 Prior to that procedure, her
doctor's clinic gave her a patient-information packet that included a warning about
postabortion depression. 177 The woman then signed an informed-consent form
confirming that she had read about and fully understood the abortion risks specified
in the packet. 178 However, in her subsequent suit against the doctor, the woman
argued that the information she received was deficient. Specifically, she claimed that
her "crisis pregnancy" situation required the doctor to talk her out of the abortion. 179
The court rejected this claim. 180 The court held that doctors practicing in New
York have no obligation to talk patients out of abortions 181 and concluded that the
defendant's postabortion depression warnings aligned with the state's informedconsent requirements. 182 This decision suggests that warning about postabortion depression was not beyond the defendant's call of duty (perhaps because this was a
second-trimester abortion). 183 Remarkably, the defendant's standard form for informed consent included this warning, which indicates that at least some doctors
were providing the warning even in the period immediately following Casey. 184
The plaintiff in a more recent case, Doe v. Planned Parenthood, 185 raised two
independent claims based on her doctor's failure to alert her to the postabortion
depression possibility. She first alleged that the defendants- the Planned Parenthood
doctors, nurses, and counsel-failed to inform her "that an abortion 'procedure

175. Perez v. Park Madison Prof'l Labs., 630 N.Y.S.2d 37, 40-41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
176. Id. at 38- 39.
177. Id. at 39.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 41. As the court described her claims, "[a]ccording to plaintiff, this harm [resulting from the abortion] includes mental anguish, neurosis, guilt, sleeplessness and depression from the awareness that, by reason of defendant's negligence, she needlessly committed
an act which is in violation of her deep-seated convictions." Id. at 40.
180. Id. at 41.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 40-41 ("Having received accurate information concerning her medical condition at the time of her abortion, as well as of all the physical and emotional risks attendant
upon the procedure, plaintiff was obviously the only person in a position to know whether an
abortion under those circumstances was in violation of her personal convictions. She cannot
seek to hold defendant liable because those convictions have apparently changed since she
consented to and underwent the procedure.").
183. See id. at 39 (describing the packet, which referred to the '"possible problems related
to second trimester abortions' including the potential medical and emotional risks").
184. Id.; see also id. at 40 ("[E]vidence in this case shows that plaintiff was specifically
told of the risk of sadness and depression and the possibility of serious depression as a result
ofan abortion.").
185. Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564 (111. App. Ct. 2011). Note that
plaintiff was represented by Harold Cassidy, the same attorney who brought the Acuna case
and the chief architect of the South Dakota law. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right 's Reasons:
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1641, 1646 n.16 (2008) (detailing Cassidy's involvement in South Dakota legislation);
see also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of WomanProtective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. LLL. L. REV. 991 , 1027 & n.150 (same).
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would terminate the life of a second patient, a living human being as a matter of
biological fact. "' 186 The second claim charged that the defendants failed to notify her
that ''there is a greater risk of ... depression ... in women who undergo an abortion
than in those who give birth." 187 The first of those complaints was identical to the
plaintiffs allegation in Acuna, 188 and the court relied heavily on Acuna in rejecting it. 189
Remarkably, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action without addressing her second claim. In reaching that decision, the court assumed that this claim, too, relied on
the already-rejected theory that ascribes "living human being" status to embryos. 190
Alas, this assumption was wrong. The plaintiff's second claim alluded to the general
incidence of postabortion depression as an empirical fact unassociated with any specific perception of embryos. The court therefore should have properly addressed this
argument but failed to do so. Under current law, however, this argument would have
been unlikely to prevail; this is because Illinois follows the "doctors' custom" standard, 191 under which doctors are not obligated to notify patients about remote scenarios that the medical profession deems immaterial. 192
The upshot of the preceding analysis is straightforward. Although the "doctors'
custom" standard does not presently obligate doctors to warn patients about postabortion depression, under the "patient expectation" standard things might be different. As we have explained, the "patient expectation" standard requires doctors to
inform patients about remote scenarios that involve substantial harm to the patient. 193
This standard therefore provides fertile ground for the South Dakota effect. 194
This understanding of the current legal situation is far from speculative. As we
have noted, it guides the operations of the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, a major organiz.ation that provides reproductive health and abortion services to millions of women across the United States. 195 Planned Parenthood informs
women contemplating an abortion that, although "[s]erious, long-term emotional
problems after abortion are . .. uncommon," they have been observed in some

186. Doe, 956 N.E.2d at 567.
187. Id.
188. See Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416,418 (N.J. 2007).
189. Doe, 956 N.E.2d at 572 ("We echo the observation of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
No court, regardless of where it sits, has found a common law duty requiring doctors to tell
their pregnant patients that aborting an embryo, or fetus, is the killing of an existing human
being." (emphasis omitted)).
190. Id. at 573- 74.
191. ld.at568- 59.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 92- 93 and accompanying text.
194. Although none of these cases resulted in victories for the plaintiffs, they may nonetheless represent examples of what Douglas NeJaime has termed "winning through losing."
As NeJaime explains, "[l]itigation loss may, counterintuitively, produce winners. When savvy
advocates lose in court, they may nonetheless configure the loss in ways that result in productive social movement effects and lead to more effective reform strategies." Douglas NeJaime,
Winning Through losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941 , 945 (2011); see also Ben Depoorter, Essay,
The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (2013) (analyzing strategic decisions of litigants who pursue hopeless litigation to highlight misfortunes and create public outcry).
195. See learn, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (2014), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn
(https://perma.cc/MK.52-LXFN].
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cases. 196 The organization then moves on to clarify that women ''having a history of
emotional problems," "having important people in [their lives] who aren't supportive
of [their] decision to have an abortion," or "having to terminate a wanted pregnancy
[for health reasons]" are more likely to develop serious postabortion depression. 197
Consistent with our projection, 198 Planned Parenthood also apprises women of the
fact that "[s]erious, long-term emotional problems after abortion are about as uncommon as they are after giving birth." 199
All of this shows that the South Dakota effect is real rather than merely theoretical. To the extent that it forces doctors to instill medically unsubstantiated fears in
their abortion patients, this effect is unfair to women in at least two ways. First, it
may dissuade women from electing abortions they have determined are in their best
interests. 200 Second, it may actually make postabortion depression more likely, since
the risk of being depressed after an abortion is not independent of the abortion experience itself. Remarkably, two studies have identified a positive correlation between
the intensity of antiabortion activities outside of clinics-picketing, demonstrations,
and related activities-and patients' postabortion depression symptoms. 201 It is entirely possible that warnings about postabortion depression could have similar
effects.
The South Dakota effect is also detrimental to the practice of medicine, intruding
into the doctor-patient relationship and compelling doctors to provide information
they do not believe is necessary, medically accurate, or in their patients' best

196. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 142.
197. Id.
198. See supra Part II. Arguably, Planned Parenthood may also be trying to prevent unfavorable legislation in the states that have yet to follow the South Dakota example by making
such legislation unnecessary. Cf Guy Halfteck, legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REV. 629
(2008) (revealing that organizations often have reasons for acting preemptively to make unfavorable legislation unnecessary). We thank Judge Joseph Colquitt for alerting us to this
possibility.
199. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 142.
200. See Cynthia R. Daniels, Janna Ferguson, Grace Howard & Amanda Roberti, Informed
or Misinformed Consent? Abortion Policy in the United States, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
LAW 18 I, 181 (20 I 6)(finding states' statutory informed-consent materials regarding embryological and fetal development medically inaccurate and misleading).
20 I. Catherine Cozzarelli & Brenda Major, The Effects of Anti-Abortion Demonstrators
and Pro-Choice Escorts on Women 's Psychological Responses to Abortion, 13 J. Soc &
CLINJCAL PSYCHOL. 404 (1994); Catherine Cozzarelli, Brenda Major, Angela Karrasch &
Kathleen Fuegen, Women's Experiences ofand Reactions to Antiabortion Picketing, 22 BASIC
& APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 265 (2000). Such research suggests that warnings about postabortion depression may tum into self-fulfilling prophecies. See Harper Jean Tobin,
Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain laws,
17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 125 (2008) ("The harm of such requirements most likely lies
less in scaring women into not getting abortions, but in elevating the fear and anxiety women
experience when they do have abortions."). But see Diana Greene Foster, Katrina Kimport,
Heather Gould, Sarah C.M. Roberts & Tracy A. Weitz, Effect of Abortion Protesters on
Women 's Emotional Response to Abortion, 87 CONTRACEPTION 81 , 86 (2013) (showing that
protesters do upset women seeking abortion services, but the women' s negative emotions are
transient).
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interests. 202 With all this in mind, we now tum to developing a legal mechanism that
will eliminate these effects. This mechanism will prevent South Dakota-style
informed-consent requirements from taking hold nationwide.
IU. SOLUTIONS

The South Dakota effect poses a real threat-to women seeking to exercise the
right announced in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey, to doctors seeking to provide their
patients with appropriate and personalized care, and to basic precepts of federalism.203 Absent the South Dakota effect, women who sought to terminate their pregnancies in most states could do so without encountering a litany of medically unnecessary warnings designed to communicate a preference for childbirth over
abortion and, ultimately, to dissuade them from electing the abortion procedure. And
absent the South Dakota effect. states would not be burdened by spillovers that interfere with their determinations of how to balance the competing interests identified
in Roe and Casey.
Moreover, women who find themselves subject to heightened warnings in states
that do not legislatively mandate such warnings could find themselves in a difficult
position, beyond the burden of simply receiving the warnings; that is, though the
warnings themselves may be untruthful and misleading and thus contravene Casey,
women in such states will be unable to mount constitutional challenges to these potentially unconstitutional warnings because they are not mandated by statute or otherwise the product of state action. 204
As we have shown, the South Dakota effect works not because of the quality of
the information that it spreads across the states. Indeed, the prevailing view of the
medical community is that the risk of postabortion depression is likely to be insignificant for the majority of patients and, in any event, comparable to the risk of
depression faced by women who carry pregnancies to term, particularly unwanted
pregnancies. 205 The effect works, instead, because of the nature of the law of informed consent. Because many states mandate the provision of information about all
conceivable risks of substantial harm, the South Dakota effect exposes doctors, even
in states that have not mandated any abortion-specific warnings, to suit for informedconsent violation while offering them an expedient way to avoid suit. And because
the remaining states base their informed-consent standards on dominant medical

202. See Lazzarini, supra note 139, at 2189 ("The [South Dakota] law is unique in ways
that should cause concern to physicians, patients, and protectors of the physician- patient relationship. As part of an ongoing challenge to abortion, it has import far beyond the borders of
South Dakota.").
203. Seth F. Kreimer, The law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right To
Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451,463
(1992) ("American citizens may be subject to different moral agendas in different locations.
This is the essence of American federalism.").
204. We thank Reva Siegel for bringing this point to our attention.
205. See Sawicki, supra note 163, at 12 n.42; Siegel, supra note 16, at 1719 n.81.
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practice, the South Dakota effect threatens to upend medical practice in those states
as well. 206
As we have noted, the Supreme Court has expressly approved heightened
informed-consent warnings in the context of abortion.207 But even in the absence of
that approval, conventional federalism doctrine would seem to offer South Dakota
and like-minded states considerable latitude to experiment-within the bounds of the
Constitution-with the optimal balance between women's autonomy and dignity interests, on the one hand, and the state's interest in protecting potential life, on the
other. This latitude stems from the basic tenets of federalism, which views states as
social laboratories208 engaged in "innovation and experimentation"209 while competing against each other "for a mobile citizenry." 210
Here, however, neither truth seeking nor pluralism and fair competition is at play.
Instead, the South Dakota view of postabortion depression threatens to take hold nationally regardless of merit. Rather than allow truth to prevail after a robust
competition on the marketplace of ideas, the informed-consent laws of South Dakota
and like-minded states may lead to the diffusion of unchecked information across
state lines.
Some might argue that the South Dakota effect will be mitigated by "abortion
exceptionalism." 211 States, so goes the argument, adopt and implement their distinct
preferences and policies with regard to abortion. These preferences and policies are
determined primarily by politically active citizens and interest groups. State courts
will tend to follow these internal preferences and policies, while refusing to
incorporate legal rules or norms that emanate from ideologically dissimilar states.

206. Cf Lazzarini, supra note 139, at 2191 ("Although some may view South Dakota's
restrictive abortion provisions as affecting only the 700 or so women who seek an abortion in
that state each year, such complacency may be misplaced. These provisions mark a substantial
inroad into the physician- patient relationship that ought to worry any practicing physician.").
207. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,882 (1992); cf Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
208. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 3H (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
209. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also MALCOLM FEELEY &
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM I (2008) (cataloguing arguments in favor of federalism, including that it "maximizes the extent to which the political system can reflect the preferences of
individuals living within it"); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 3 I 7,
397- 98 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders ' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1498- 1500 (1987) (book review) (discussing "[i]nnovation and competition in government" arguments for federalism); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. I, 3- 10 (1988).
210. Gregory, 50 I U.S. at 458; see also Epstein, supra note 24, at 150 ("The great virtue
of federalism is that it introduces an important measure of competition between
governments.").
211. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortion, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1210
(2014) ("Abortion exceptionalism means the rules are different for abortion cases.").
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This dynamic could immunize the informed-consent doctrines of pro-choice states
against the South Dakota effect. 212
We believe that this mitigating effect is limited. Abortion exceptionalism is a
"soft" cultural and political phenomenon, whereas the South Dakota effect is
grounded in doctrine. Consider a doctor who provides abortion services in
Connecticut-a "patient expectation" state 213 with comparatively permissive abortion laws. Once the South Dakota effect takes hold, can this doctor ignore what she
feels may be an emerging duty to notify patients about the small risk of postabortion
depression? We believe that the doctor cannot do so, even if she is very optimistic
about the effect of Connecticut's abortion exceptionalism on the courts' malpractice
decisions. The reason is simple: the doctor's optimism gives her no guarantee of immunity against malpractice accusations in the event she decides not to warn her patients about postabortion depression. On the other hand, the doctor can eliminate the
prospect of liability by introducing South Dakota's information into her informedconsent dialogues with patients; and as we have explained, she can do so at a very
low cost to herself. 214
For these reasons, the South Dakota effect is likely to change doctors' practices
in "patient expectation" jurisdictions-a change that will incrementally affect doctors' customs as well. 215 We are skeptical about state courts' ability to stop this process, given the self-updating and doctor-dependent nature of the informed-consent
doctrine. Note in this connection that doctors motivated by the desire to fend off
malpractice suits will respond to the South Dakota effect before courts, as illustrated
by the Planned Parenthood example. 216 The South Dakota effect therefore calls for a
robust countermeasure best provided by proactive legislators.
Based on this observation, we now develop two legislative solutions: federal and
state. We first present these solutions and then discuss their distinct advantages and
disadvantages.
A. Federalizing Informed Consent

The first possibility we envision is for Congress to create a federal default standard establishing that abortion-specific rules of informed consent can only be created
by affirmative state legislation or through the organic evolution of doctors' customs.
Under this federal statute, doctors would only be required to inform patients about
the risk of postabortion depression under two circumstances: 1) if such warnings
were consistent with accepted standards in the field, or 2) if state statute expressly
required them to do so. Ln either case, warnings could only be mandated subject to
Casey's "truthful, nonmisleading information" proviso. 217
This proposal is consistent with one of the basic precepts of mainstream theories
offederalism: while generally avoiding interference with state sovereignty, Congress

212. We thank Gillian Metzger for this insight.
213. Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 300--01 (Conn. 1983) (holding that
reasonable patient's expectation standard applies in Connecticut).
214. See supra notes 35- 37 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 133- 35 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 195- 99 and accompanying text.
217. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,882 (1992).
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should step in to protect states from undesirable spillover effects from other states. 218
As Professor Gillian Metzger has noted in connection with interstate relations,
"[i]nstitutionally, Congress is best positioned to determine the national interest and
the need for state restrictions."219 Indeed, even scholars who contend that interstate
spillovers should under some circumstances be celebrated-as do Professor Heather
Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt220-also believe that Congress has a role to play in mediating such spillovers. 221
We turn now to the mechanics of this proposal. We begin by sketching out the
core elements of a federal legislative solution to the problems posed by the South
Dakota effect. We then defend the constitutionality of that solution.
I. The Proposed Legislation
A federal legislative solution to the South Dakota effect could take a number of
different forms, ranging from the creation of a federal default standard to complete
preemption of state law.222 Among these solutions, we restrict our discussion to the

218. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 892- 93; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 557 n.3 (2001)
("The presence of interstate externalities is a compelling argument for federal regulation.");
see also Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 922 ( 1996) ("The most obvious justifications for federal law that supersedes state law is that state law produces effects that are felt beyond the territorial limits of the
states themselves or that there is some significant need for national uniformity in the content
of legal rules."). Although Schwartz argues against federal regulation of medical malpractice,
his argument is both focused on proposed liability caps and premised on the assumption that
"malpractice seems strikingly lacking in ... spill-over effects." Id. ; cf Richard L. Revesz, The
Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MLNN.
L. REV. 535, 536-37 ( 1997) (favoring decentralization as a presumptive norm for environmental protection due to regional diversities, variegated benefits and differential costs of compliance). Note, however, that Revesz's presumption in favor of decentralization does not apply
in the presence of interstate spillovers. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1222- 23 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, Interstate
Competition].
219. Metzger, supra note 45, at 1531. See also POSNER supra note 24, at 893 ("Insofar as
a coordinated response is optimal, and given transaction costs, .. . it doesn't make sense to
leave the response to state and local governments."); cf Revesz, Interstate Competition, supra
note 218, at 1222- 24 (justifying federal regulation that counters interstate externalities and
race to the bottom).
220. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at I 08 ("Congress is the most obvious institution
safeguarding horizontal federalism, just as it was Wechsler's prime candidate for safeguarding
vertical federalism." (footnote omitted)).
221. Id. ; see also Mark D. Rosen, Essay, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2010)(arguing that Congress, notthe courts, is best situated
to check "states' exercise of extraterritorial powers").
222. The more aggressive approach would involve the creation of a uniform federal standard for informed consent to abortion, preempting all state informed-consent laws in the context
of abortion. See O'Connor & Ribstein, supra note 111 at 664 (arguing that where states do not
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one that would be least politically controversial: the creation of a federal default
standard that would allow doctors in most states to practice without fear of the
spillover effects described above. As we envision it, the federal statute would provide
that, absent state legislative action to the contrary, no abortion-specific informedconsent warnings would be read into doctors' professional norms of conduct, unless
doctors' customs had coalesced around the provision of such warnings. This statute
would counteract the South Dakota effect, preserving the general standards in effect
in the majority of states.
lmportantly, states would remain free to legislate around our proposed default
rule- South Dakota, for example, would not be prevented by such a rule from
implementing its chosen informed-consent law. Federal law would merely create a
safe harbor for doctors working in the states that did not legislate any heightened
warnings. These doctors would be able to practice without fear of suit for failure to
provide their patients with South Dakota's (or similar) warnings about the risks of
abortion.
Prior to legislating, Congress would be well advised to engage in factfinding
around the actual risks of abortion procedures, including in particular any risks
related to depression and suicide ideation. This factfinding undertaking should rely
on testimony by medical experts, psychologists, and social scientists. Consideration
of the views and research of experts would substantially improve the quality of the
resulting legislation. 223
As we have noted, there is broad consensus within the medical profession that no
serious risks of depression, suicide, or suicide ideation attend ordinary abortion procedures.224 We expect that a thorough assessment of the available evidence would
lead Congress to that conclusion. But even if some conflicting evidence were presented during the course of congressional factfinding-and there likely would
be225-(;ongress would still be entitled to act. As the Supreme Court explained in
Gonzales v. Carhart, ''The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty ... .
Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts." 226 Accordingly, so long as the

coordinate among themselves, "Congress can exercise its Commerce Clause or other constitutional authority to supplant state substantive Jaws with uniform federal Jaw").
223 . ln addition, some factfinding around the nexus of abortion and informed consent with
interstate commerce would ensure that the statute was on firm constitutional footing.
224. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
225. Although the weight ofauthority supports the position that there is minimal risk, some
studies have concluded that abortion is linked to depression. See supra note I 08.
226. 550 U.S. 124, 163--64 (2007). The Carhart Court made clear, however, that "uncritical deference" to Congress's findings was unwarranted where at least two congressional
findings were demonstrably false. Id. at 165--66. And the Court confirmed in Whole Woman's
Health v. He/lerstedt that where medical or scientific evidence does not support a particular
regulation of abortion, courts are not required to defer to legislatures. No. 15-274, slip op. at
23 (U.S. June 27, 20 l 6)(finding that "nothing in Texas' record evidence" established that "the
new Jaw advanced Texas' legitimate interest in protecting women's health."). See generally
Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for
the Abortion Right After Whole Woman's Health, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM (forthcoming 2016).
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weight of medical and scientific authority was found to support the view that
warnings about postabortion depression are unnecessary as a blanket matter,
Congress would be well within its power to enact the proposed statute. 227
2. Constitutional Foundation
Congress, of course, may only act pursuant to a specific constitutional grant of
power. 228 The congressional action we propose-legislation to set a federal default
standard for informed consent in the context of abortion procedures-would be undertaken under the Commerce Clause. 229 A brief overview of recent Commerce
Clause jurisprudence establishes that our proposal would clearly constitute a permissible exercise of congressional power. 230
Although the past twenty years have seen substantial shifts, as well as a number
of competing strains, in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 231 the
Court has continued to affirm that "Congress has broad authority under the
[Commerce] Clause."232 Among other things, Congress has the power to "regulate
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." 233
United States v. Morrison 234 supplies a four-part test that a number of courts have
applied when assessing Commerce Clause challenges to federal enactments: first,
whether the regulated activity is economic in nature; second, whether the relevant
federal statute contains an explicit jurisdictional requirement that the activity in question has a connection to, or effect on, interstate commerce; third, the existence of

227. But cf Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope ofJudicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. I 169, 1170 (2001) (challenging the Court's fact/law distinction as largely artificial and critiquing congressional factfinding).
228. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
229. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the power .. . [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . . . .").
230. Because our proposed legislation would regulate informed consent for abortion, rather
than the abortion right as such, it would not rely on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendmenta provision that grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." See Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique,
Morrison, and the Future ofFederal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. I 09 (2000);
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Po/icentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947
(2003).
231. Between 1937 and 1995, the Court did not sustain a single Commerce Clause challenge to a federal enactment. See generally David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism
and the Affordable Care Act, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2013). United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
546 (1995), seemed to signal a renewed judicial interest in policing the limits of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers.
232. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585.
233 . Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I, 17 (2007); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578
("Congress may regulate ... 'those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."'
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000))). Though not relevant here,
Congress also has the power to regulate the "channels" and "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16-17.
234. 529 U.S. 598.
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congressional findings regarding impact on interstate commerce; and fourth, the
strength of the link between the activity in question and interstate commerce. 235
Federal informed-consent legislation would clearly satisfy Morrison's four-part
test. As a threshold matter, abortion itself is ordinarily a commercial transaction
-the provision of medical services for compensation. 236 The Court has not always
spoken with perfect clarity about the relationship between "commercial activity" and
"economic activity," but the activities it found to be outside of congressional reach
in both Morrison itself and United States v. Lopez- violence against women and gun
possession, respectively------clearly lacked the critical feature of a compensated transaction. Here, the requisite transactional component is unquestionably present. 237
Our proposed statute would also contain the language "in or affecting interstate
commerce," which would satisfy Morrison's requirement of a jurisdictional element.
And the "congressional findings" requirement is a central element of our legislative
proposal: as noted earlier, the legislation we contemplate would be preceded by a
rigorous congressional investigation into the psychological effects of abortion.
Equally clear is the nexus of abortion services with interstate commerce. Even
with a rash of state laws designed to shut down clinics and limit abortions, 238 abortion
remains one of the most common surgical procedures performed in the country. 239
Patients seeking abortions may, and often do, cross state lines to visit clinics; doctors

235. Id. at 610-12.
236. Of course, some procedures are offered at a reduced rate, perhaps even free of charge;
and it could be argued that as-applied challenges should be possible to test Congress's power
to reach such transactions. But the Court has made clear that the existence of some such
transactions does not defeat Congress's ability to reach a category of conduct that is ordinarily
commercial: "[W]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of
federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the
class." Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (alteration in original) (quoting Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
237. The transactional element is present in all medical services except those rendered under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § I 395dd
(2012), which obligates hospitals to provide stabilizing treatment to patients with an "emergency medical condition" regardless of the patient's ability to pay for the treatment. Id.
§ 1395dd(b)(I ). Services covered by EMT ALA include a life-saving abortion, but not an elective abortion. Outside the EMTALA framework, malpractice suits against doctors and other
providers of medical care are sometimes based on contract. Stein, supra note 82, at 1236 n.191.
238. See Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem.) (reinstating district court injunction of Texas law requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at
local hospitals and imposing state standards for ambulatory surgical centers). But see Whole
Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (lifting injunction, with limited exception); Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (invalidating
Mississippi's admitting-privileges requirement); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange,
33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (invalidating Alabama's admitting-privileges
requirement).
239. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the
United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 8 (2003); Rachel K. Jones &
Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 20 JI, 46
PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 3, 3 (2014) (estimating that I.I million abortions were
performed in the United States in 2011 ).
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and clinic staff do the same. 240 Medical supplies may be purchased across state lines;
insurance plans may originate in another state, or be administered there. 241
Abortion itself, then, clearly impacts interstate commerce. But the precise subject
of federal regulation contemplated here-the standards governing legal liability for
conduct related to patient warnings in the course of providing abortion services
-also has a significant impact on interstate commerce. Doctors secure medical malpractice insurance on interstate markets; they may be sued for informed-consent violations in state or federal courts, by citizens of their own state or other states; and
they may choose jurisdictions in which to practice based on different liability regimes, some of which are expressly designed to attract doctors from other states. 242
Admittedly, the Court's most recent Commerce Clause pronouncement, NFIB v.
Sebe/ius,243 suggests a contraction in the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority; and, since the broad subject matter of the statute scrutinized in NF/B-health
care-is related to the present issue, the case warrants careful consideration. But such
consideration establishes that none of the infirmities the Court found in NFJB is present here.
At issue in NFJB was the Affordable Care Act's requirement that all individuals
purchase health insurance or pay a penalty ("the individual mandate"). In finding that
the individual mandate exceeded the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power,
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion focused first on the novelty of the individual mandate, explaining that "sometimes 'the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem ... is the lack of historical precedent' for Congress's action." 244 No

240. See John H. Richardson, The Abortion Ministry of Dr. Willie Parker, ESQUIRE
(July 30, 2014 ), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a23771/abortion-ministry-of-<ir-willie-parker
-0914/ [https://perma.cc/NSF7-DS7B] (describing extensive interstate travel by patients seeking abortions and by the subject of the piece, a doctor who performs abortions in a number of
states); cf United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to federal Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(aX1) (2012)).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675,680 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Health] facilities will obviously purchase, use, and distribute goods from other States.").
242. Anup Malani, Valuing laws as local Amenities, 121 HA.Rv. L. REV. 1273, 1284
(2008) ("[E]xamples of migration due to legal changes can be found in the medical community, where there are numerous anecdotes of doctors, in order to curb their malpractice liability
costs, leaving states that do not enact tort reform. ln fact, there is some empirical support for
the proposition that doctors systematically move to avoid tort liability. As in the gay and lesbian community, there are advocacy groups- the American Medical Association, for onethat maintain websites to inform doctors of states with friendly tort law environments."
(internal citations omitted)).
243 . 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
244. Id. at 2586 (alteration in original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)). A number of commentators, even those who advocate a more limited view of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, have been critical of this
aspect of the decision, noting that the "same charge could be leveled at every major piece of
Commerce Clause legislation- labor and employment statutes, the Civil Rights Act, environmental laws, and the like. All new laws are, by definition, novel." Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. &
Grant S. Nelson, The likely Impact of National Federation on Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 991 (2013).
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such suggestion could be made here. Congress has a long history of regulating the
medical profession, 245 including in the context of both medical malpractice and
abortion.
The Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986, which, among other things,
created the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), supplies the most important
precedent. The NPDB collects data on malpractice judgments, settlements, and disciplinary actions, and makes that data available to hospitals and other medical care
organizations. 246 Although the Supreme Court has never considered the question,
courts of appeals have uniformly rejected Commerce Clause and other constitutional
challenges to the NPDB. 247 This fact is of paramount importance for our purposes:
among other things, the NPDB collects information about doctors' informed-consent
violations. 248 This information becomes part of doctors' malpractice records, which
hospitals and other medical care organizations use for purposes of hiring, promoting,
and credentialing. 249
In addition, the legislation we propose is consistent with a tradition of congressional regulation of a number of aspects of abortion. First, in the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE), 25 Congress broadly prohibited threats and
violence directed at either providers or consumers of abortion services. Every federal
appellate court to consider the constitutionality of FACE has upheld it as a permissible exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 251 And, although the Supreme
Court has not directly considered FACE's constitutionality, in 2014 it suggested that
Massachusetts could avoid the First Amendment infirmities that doomed that state's
"buffer zone" law252 by modeling its state law after the federal FACE. 253
Perhaps still more telling is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
(PBABA), 254 which the Court upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart. 255 Although the
Carhart Court did not undertake any sustained examination of Congress's power to

°

245 . See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322,329 (1991) (finding interstate
commerce requirements of antitrust laws satisfied by hospital petitioners and noting that
"although Midway' s primary activity is the provision of health care services in a local market,
it also engages in interstate commerce").
246. 42 u.s.c. §§ 11101- 11115, 11131- 11153 (2012).
247. See, e.g., Roehling v. Dep't Veteran' s Affairs, 725 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2013); Freilich
v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 2002).
248. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101- 11 11 5, 11131- 11153 (2012).
249. Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The Constitutionality ofthe Federal System for
Publishing Reports of "Bad" Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CAROOZO
L.REv. 2031 (2012).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(l) (2012).
251. See, e.g., Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 555- 56 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373- 74
(7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 1996).
252. MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 266, § 120El;2(a), (b) (2010) (amended 2014), invalidated by
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
253 . McCul/en, 134 S. Ct. at 2537 ("If Massachusetts determines that broader prohibitions
along the same lines are necessary, it could enact legislation similar to the federal Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE Act), 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) .... ").
254. 18 u.s.c. § 1531 (2012).
255. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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enact the PBABA, it did note in passing that "the legislative power" was "exercised
in this instance under the Commerce Clause."256 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, wrote separately to state his view that "whether the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause [was] not before the Court." 257 But the majority was silent on any
potential Commerce Clause concems. 258
In light of this extensive record of federal regulation of both medical malpractice
and abortion, it seems clear that the modest step we propose would be well within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority. In fact, it is likely that Congress could, if it
wished, go much further than our proposal. Indeed, Professor Richard Fallon argues
that "[i]f Congress so chose, it could either forbid or protect abortion on a nationwide basis."259
Our proposal might face one additional constitutional objection. Arguably, legislation along the lines we suggest would inject Congress into a sphere that has traditionally been regulated by the states alone- setting substantive liability standards for
a category of tort actions. 260 United States v. Lopez suggested that congressional
attempts to regulate areas of "traditional state concem" 261 would be constitutionally
suspect. 262

256. Id. at 166.
257. Id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring).
258. Cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (upholding constitutionality of
Department of Health and Human Services regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 2923- 2924 (1988), that
prohibit Title X projects from advocating abortion as a method of family planning).
259. Fallon, supra note 2, at 612. Professor Fallon contends (albeit in a piece that predates
NFIB) that "[u]nder existing Commerce Clause doctrine, congressional power to regulate and
thus to prohibit abortions would seem plain. Abortions are services sold in interstate commerce, and the business of providing medical care, including abortions, is intertwined with
commerce in innumerable ways." Id. at 622- 23. ln a proposal not unlike the one we advance
here, Professor Fallon suggests that Congress might also choose to regulate the practice of
abortion through a federal licensing scheme for abortion doctors. Id. at 624; see also Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Essay, Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth
Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 349 (2005) ("[L]ike medical services generally, abortions of all kinds are commercial exchanges" that '" concern more states than one."' (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 194 (1824))).
260. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Lochner 's legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County
v. Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REv. 727, 728- 29 (2005) (arguing that the Rehnquist
Court's federalism decisions can largely be explained by whether "the regulatory area at issue
is one in which States 'historically have been sovereign' or is instead a traditional and appropriate area offederal concern").
261. 514 U.S. 549,577 (1995)(Kennedy, J., concurring).
262. Id. Note, however, that Lopez paired that concern with its insistence that the activity
be commercial in character. Id. at 583 ("The statute now before us forecloses the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right
of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce
in the ordinary and usual sense of that term."). As we have already shown, our proposed statute
squarely falls into the "commercial" category.
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But Congress has long since entered the domain of torts through numerous statutory interventions into products liability, 263 including liability for medications, 264
medical devices, 265 and vaccines. 266 One of those interventions, the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 267 was quite far-reaching. With this Act,
Congress displaced the entire regime of state products liability with a special compensation program for vaccine-related injuries. 268 Our proposal is a far more limited one.
One final objection to this proposal, perhaps the most serious one, is grounded not
in legal but in political constraints. Although "[ s]pillovers can get issues on the national policymaking agenda,"269 politics, especially at the national level, are more
polarized today than perhaps at any other time in our history. 270 And independent of
larger polarization trends, abortion has for decades been one of the most divisive
issues in American politics. 271 Mindful of the possibility that tackling this subject
might merely afford federal legislators an opportunity to reengage in democratic warfare over abortion, we offer an alternative solution to the South Dakota effect: legislation within the states.
B. A State-by-State Solution

Another possible response to the South Dakota effect is for individual states to
affirmatively repel the spillover effects identified above. The mechanics of such legislation would be relatively straightforward: in essence, state legislation would

263 . See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (finding state common
law defective design claims preempted by National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530- 31 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of I 969 preempted state failure-to-warn
claims); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449, 450 (2008); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88
GEO. L.J. 2085, 2118 (2000).
264. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 - 397 (2012).
265. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding various state tort claims
against manufacturer of balloon catheter preempted by Medical Device Amendments of 1976);
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (holding state-law fraud-onthe-agency claims regarding approval of bone screws preempted by Medical Device
Amendments of 1976).
266. 42 U.S.C § 300aa- 22(b)(1)(2012). ·
267. Id.
268. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 228- 30(2011).
269. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at 90.
270. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1082- 83
(2014) ("[O)ur two major political parties, which compete at both the state and national levels,
have grown ideologically cohesive and polarized."); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2312, 2338 (2006)(describing "resurgence of more internally unified, ideologically coherent, and polarized parties than we have
seen in many decades"); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 275 (201 I) ("American democracy over the last generation has had one defining attribute: the rise of extreme partisan
polarization.").
271. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 270, at 1104, 1116.
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merely establish that informed consent in the context of abortion is no different from
informed consent for other medical procedures.
The law could take several different forms. First, state law could affirmatively
disclaim any blanket requirement that doctors provide women seeking abortions with
information relating to depression or suicide (though doctors would remain free to
provide patient-specific warnings, including warnings pertaining to potential psychological effects of abortion in individual cases). Second, state legislation could require
that doctors who provide warnings about the potential psychological effects of abortion pair those warnings with information about possible psychological effects of
carrying a pregnancy to term-in particular, postpartum depression.
A solution that requires individual states to ward off the South Dakota effect statutorily is in some ways less efficient than allowing Congress-a single player that
operates within a framework of legal and political checks and balances, and utilizes
economies of scale-to take action. But in the absence of a congressional will to act,
individual states, particularly those states whose legal frameworks aim to facilitate
relatively unimpeded access to abortion, would be well advised to take action.
In their novel account of horizontal federalism, Professor Heather Gerken and Ari
Holtzblatt argue that "[s]pillovers are a permanent and inevitable feature of the
American regulatory landscape" 272 and suggest that the interstate friction caused by
spillovers can in fact be politically beneficial. 273 Specifically, it can "spur democratic
engagement" and drive productive compromise around controversial issues. 274 The
state-by-state solution we envision is arguably an example of just this sort of dynamic: the use of state-level democratic processes to deflect unwanted legal rules
from crossing state lines.
CONCLUSION

Since Roe v. Wade , the struggle between women' s constitutional entitlement to
abortion and state power to regulate that entitlement has been conventionally understood to proceed along vertical lines. The states' boundaries have demarcated the
terrain on which abortion restrictions imposed by states have clashed with the reproductive freedom secured by the U.S. Constitution.
Our account uncovers a previously invisible horizontal dimension of that struggle:
the medical-malpractice penalties imposed upon doctors for failing to fully inform
patients about abortion risks; the states' power to define those risks, along with doctors' informed-consent obligations and penalties; and, critically, the porousness of
state borders in this sphere. That porousness, which allows medical standards from
one state to affect doctors' practices and informed-consent obligations across state
lines, can have profound implications both for individuals and for state
sovereignty. 275
The South Dakota effect is just one dynamic by which abortion access may be
limited. It is a dynamic, however, that may have serious consequences for women's

272. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 45, at 62.
273 . Id.
274. Id. at 96.
275. Cf Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 503 (2008) ("Disputes implicating horizontal federalism .. . can involve both states and individuals.").

54

IND/ANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 92: I

willingness to elect abortion and for the experiences of women who choose to go
forward with abortion procedures. More broadly, it highlights the importance of widening our focus to consider interstate effects in the context of abortion regulation.
And as such, it sheds new light on the law of abortion and federalism itself.

